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Abstract
Many workers with low levels of educational attainment immigrated to the United States
in recent decades. Large inﬂows of less educated immigrants would reduce wages paid to
comparably-educated native-born workers if the two groups are perfectly substitutable in
production. In a simple model exploiting comparative advantage, however, we show that if
less educated foreign and native-born workers specialize in performing diﬀerent tasks, immi-
gration will cause natives to reallocate their task supply, thereby reducing downward wage
pressure. We merge occupational task-intensity data from the O*NET dataset with individ-
ual Census data across US states from 1960-2000 to demonstrate that foreign-born workers
specialize in occupations that require manual and physical labor skills while natives pur-
sue jobs more intensive in communication and language tasks. Immigration induces natives
to specialize accordingly. Simulations show that this increased specialization might explain
why economic analyses commonly ﬁnd only modest wage and employment consequences of
immigration for less educated native-born workers across US states.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Immigration has signiﬁcantly aﬀected the US labor market during the last few decades, particularly
increasing the supply of workers with low levels of formal schooling. Economists continue to debate
the wage eﬀects of these large inﬂows on native-born workers. If workers’ skills are diﬀerentiated
solely by their level of educational attainment, and if the production technology and productivity
of each type of labor are given, then a large inﬂow of immigrants with limited schooling should
alter the relative scarcity of education groups, increase wages paid to highly-educated natives, and
reduce wages paid to less educated ones. Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) adopt this
intuitive approach and use US national-level data to argue that immigration reduced real wages
paid to native-born workers without a high school degree by four to ﬁve percent between 1980 and
2000. Area studies by Card (2001, 2007), Card and Lewis (2007), and Lewis (2005), in contrast,
employ city and state level data and ﬁnd almost no eﬀect of immigration on the wages of less
educated native workers.
Ottaviano and Peri (2006 and 2008) emphasize that the eﬀects of immigration depend upon
whether native and foreign-born workers with similar observable characteristics are imperfect
substitutes in production. They argue that immigrants and natives of comparable educational at-
tainment and experience possess unique skills that lead them to specialize in diﬀerent occupations,
which mitigates natives’ wage losses from immigration.1 We advance this literature by developing
a theory and performing empirical analysis to demonstrate how native and foreign-born workers
are imperfect substitutes in production.
We focus on workers with little educational attainment and argue that less educated native
and immigrant workers specialize in diﬀerentiated production tasks. Immigrants are likely to
have imperfect language (or equivalently, “communication”) skills, but they possess physical (or
“manual”) skills similar to those of native-born workers. Thus, they have a comparative advantage
in occupations requiring manual labor tasks, while less educated native-born workers will have an
advantage in jobs demanding communication skills. Immigration encourages workers to specialize
— less educated natives respond to immigration by leaving physically demanding occupations for
language-intensive ones. Importantly, language-intensive tasks tend to earn a comparatively higher
return, and those returns are further enhanced by the increased aggregate supply of complementary
manual-intensive tasks. Therefore, productivity gains from specialization coupled with the high
compensation paid to communication skills together imply that foreign-born workers do not create
large adverse consequences for wages paid to less educated natives.
1Manacorda et. al. (2007) and D’Amuri et al. (2008) argue for similar imperfect substitutability between native
and immigrant workers in the UK and Germany, respectively. Other important contributions to the literature on
immigration and wages include Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas (1994, 1995, 1999, 2003), Borjas, Freeman, and
Katz (1997), Butcher and Card (1991), Card (1990), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Friedberg (2001), and National
Research Council (1997).
2W eb e g i ni nS e c t i o n2b yd e s c r i b i n gas i m p l em o del of comparative advantage and incomplete
specialization of workers. Workers’ skill endowments imply that immigration reduces the compen-
sation paid to manual tasks and increases the compensation paid to communication tasks. The
complementary nature of the two skills and the reallocation of native workers toward communi-
cation tasks favor wages paid to native workers. The eﬀects compensate (in part or entirely) for
the depressing eﬀect of immigration on the wage paid to manual tasks.
Section 3 describes the decennial data for the 50 US states (plus the District of Columbia)
from 1960 to 2000 and the construction of the variables that we use to test our model. Census
occupation codes allow us to merge occupational characteristics with individual-level data from the
IPUMS Census microdata (Ruggles et. al. (2005)). To measure the manual and communication
skill intensity of occupations, we use the US Department of Labor’s O*NET dataset on job task
requirements. This dataset measures the importance of several physical (dexterity, coordination,
and strength) and language (oral and written comprehension and expression) abilities within each
Census occupation code. Data values are based upon experts’ recent (post 2000) assessments and
therefore reﬂect the current use of skills across occupations.2
The empirical analysis in Section 4 strongly supports key implications of our theory. States
with large inﬂows of less educated immigrants, relative to those with small ﬂows, also experienced
i) a greater shift in skill supply among less educated native-born workers toward communication
tasks and away from manual ones; ii) a greater decrease in the total supply of communication
relative to manual skills; and iii) a greater increase in the compensation paid to communication
relative to manual skills. These results are upheld by two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions
that instrument for the variation of less educated immigrants across states using two diﬀerent sets
of exogenous variables, both of which exploit the increased level of Mexican immigration as an
exogenous supply shift at the state level. The ﬁrst follows a strategy similar to Card (2001), Card
and DiNardo (2000), and Cortes (2008) by using the imputed share of Mexican workers (based
upon 1960 state demographics and subsequent national growth rates) as a proxy for the share
of less educated immigrants in a state. The second set of instruments interacts decade indicator
variables with the distance of a state’s center of gravity to the Mexico-US border, its square, and
ab o r d e rd u m m y .
Section 4 also performs a host of robustness checks to ensure that the results are not spuriously
2Our analysis ignores changes in the task content of occupations over time. Thus, we might underestimate
the eﬀect of immigration on task performance of natives by capturing only the part due to reallocation across
occupations. In Peri and Sparber (2008c), we use Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)a n dO*NET measures
of skill intensity. The DOT identiﬁes the intensity of skill use in occupations measured in 1977 and 1991, and
therefore accounts for changes over time. Unfortunately, that dataset contains only two measures of manual skills
(Eye, Hand, and Foot Coordination and Finger Dexterity) and an imperfect measure of communication abilities (the
performance of Direction, Control, and Planning activities) that encompasses many tasks in addition to language
skills. Despite the diﬀerences between datasets and skill intensity measures, we found remarkably similar and
robust results. We refer the reader to Peri and Sparber (2008c) for a more detailed description of analysis and
results using DOT variables.
3driven. We control for possible shifts in the demand for skills, analyze how labor ﬂows aﬀect
previous immigrant groups and highly-educated natives, and assess how the eﬀects of immigration
vary across demographic groups. The results of these checks again support the implications of our
model. Moreover, we brieﬂy demonstrate that the results are not driven by displacement eﬀects,
as natives do not respond to immigration by moving to areas with fewer foreign-born workers or
by dropping out the labor force — an issue of concern for many area studies in the immigration
literature.3
Given the positive wage eﬀect of specializing in language-intensive occupations, native-born
workers can protect their wages and mitigate losses due to immigration by reallocating their tasks.
In Section 5, we use our model and empirical results to calculate the eﬀect of immigration (among
workers of all education levels) on average wages paid to native-born employees with a high school
degree or less. Task complementarities and increasing specialization among native-born workers
imply that the wage impact of immigration on less educated natives, while usually negative, is
very small for the US overall. While less educated natives in states receiving a disproportionately
large number of less educated immigrants (relative to highly-educated ones) still experience wage
losses, the eﬀects are usually small and even positive in some states.
The simulated wage eﬀects for natives and immigrants also allow us to calculate the elasticity of
substitution between immigrants and natives implied by our model. We estimate a value between
20 and 47, with an average of 33. These ﬁgures are similar to those obtained by Ottaviano and
Peri (2008), who instead estimate the inverse elasticity directly by regressing relative immigrant-
native wages on relative hours worked at the national level. Hence, the mechanism proposed in our
model is able to explain much of the imperfect substitutability more directly estimated in other
papers. Altogether, our ﬁndings agree in spirit with those of Card (2001), Card and Lewis (2007),
and Card (2007) while adding a new dimension and more micro-foundations to the structural
framework introduced by Borjas (2003) and reﬁned by Ottaviano and Peri (2008).
2 Theoretical Model
We propose a simple general equilibrium model of comparative advantages in task performance
to illustrate the eﬀects of immigration on specialization and wages.4 We brieﬂyd e s c r i b et h e
model here, and provide more detailed derivations and results in the Appendix. We will test
the key qualitative implications of the model in Section 4, and use the production structure
3See Card (2001, 2007), Card and Lewis (2007), Cortes (2006), Lewis (2005), and Ottaviano and Peri (2007)
for supporting evidence.
4Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop an interesting theory of oﬀshoring that builds upon a process of
international task division. Autor and Dorn (2007) use a model of diﬀerentiated task performance to analyze the
evolution of wages in the 1980s and 1990s related to computer adoption. Those models have features similar to
ours.
4and empirically-estimated elasticities to evaluate the eﬀects of immigration on wages paid to less
educated native-born workers in Section 5.
2.1 Production
Consider an open economy (e.g., a US state) that combines two non-tradeable intermediate ser-
vices, YH and YL,i naCES production function to produce a ﬁnal tradeable consumption good,













The parameter σ ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of substitution between YH and YL.T h e
coeﬃcients β and (1 − β) capture the relative productivity of these intermediate services in the
production of good Y .T h i sﬁnal consumption good is also the numeraire, so that all prices and
wages are expressed in real terms. We assume that it is assembled by perfectly competitive ﬁrms
that minimize costs and earn no proﬁts. This ensures that the prices of YL and YH (denoted PL
and PH) are equal to their marginal products.
The two intermediate services are produced by diﬀerent workers. Low education workers (with
total labor supply equal to L)p r o d u c eYL, and high education workers (H)p r o d u c eYH.T h e
symmetric CES production function (1) combining the services of more and less educated workers
(i.e., those with and without college experience) is widely used in economics.5 Many immigration
papers, in contrast, separate workers into four education groups — high school dropouts, high school
degree holders, those with some college experience, and college graduates. However, Ottaviano
and Peri (2008) argue that workers with no degree and workers with a high school diploma were
close substitutes between 1960 and 2000, as were workers with some college education and those
with a college degree. A recent paper by Goldin and Katz (2007) also argues that “high school
graduates and dropouts are close substitutes today.” Most of the literature (including Katz and
Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), Johnson (1997), Goldin and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri
(2008)) does ﬁnd a signiﬁcant degree of imperfect substitutability between workers with a high
school diploma or less and those with some college education or more. Thus, we advocate a two-
group CES model distinguishing between workers with a high school degree or less and workers
with some college education or more.
We add to the framework above by assuming that less educated workers must perform both
manual and communication tasks in order to produce YL. Manual tasks require the use of physical
skills such as dexterity, body coordination, or strength. Communication tasks such as directing,
5For instance, the literature on cross-country income diﬀerences (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Caselli and
Coleman (2006)), technological change (Acemoglu (1998, 2002)), and labor economics (Katz and Murphy (1992),
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1997), Card and Lemieux (2001)) all use a production function similar to (1).
5managing, and organizing people require mostly language skills. Let less educated workers supply
M units of manual-task inputs and C units of communication-task inputs in the aggregate.6 These
tasks combine to produce YL according to the CES function in Equation (2), where βL ∈ (0,1)
captures the relative productivity of manual skills and θL ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of











Since this paper focuses on the market for less educated workers, we make the simplifying
assumption that highly-educated workers only perform one “analytical” (or equivalently, “cogni-
tive”) task in the production of YH.7 Alternatively, one can assume that highly-educated workers
provide both analytical and communication skills (and very few physical tasks), that those two
skills are highly substitutable, and that their relative supply and returns are not much aﬀected
by the presence of less educated immigrants.8 By standardizing the units of these tasks, we can
simply assume that YH is produced according to a linear technology equal to the total supply of
highly-educated workers. That is, YH = H.
Competitive labor markets and perfect competition among producers of YL and YH yield the
relative task demand function in Equation (3), where wM and wC denote the compensation (return)












2.2 Relative Supply of Tasks: Natives and Immigrants
Since each highly-educated worker is identical from a productive point of view, the wage paid to
these workers equals the marginal productivity of YH in (1). That is, wH = PH. In contrast,
less educated workers are heterogeneous and may diﬀer from each other in their relative task
productivity. We consider two types of workers: less educated “domestic” native-born workers
(D), and less educated “foreign-born” immigrant workers (F). We let Lj (for j = D or F)
represent the total labor supply of these groups.
Each less educated worker chooses an occupation and fully allocates one unit of time in order
to provide μj units of manual tasks, ζj units of communication tasks, or some division between
6We will use capital letters to denote aggregate values, and lower case letter to denote per capita ﬁgures,
throughout the text.
7For a more careful analysis of the interaction between natives and immigrants, and of task-specialization among
highly educated workers, see Peri and Sparber (2008b).
8We provide empirical evidence in Table 8 that shows the independence between the task supply among highly-
educated workers and the inﬂow of less-educated immigrants.
6the two. Native and immigrant workers diﬀer in that the ﬁrst has a comparative advantage in











Let lj be the share of a worker’s labor endowment (time) spent performing manual tasks in her
occupation, implying that 1 − lj is the time spent performing communication tasks. A worker’s
supply of manual task units is mj =( lj)
δ μj, while her supply of communication task units is cj =
(1 − lj)
δ ζj. The parameter δ ∈ (0,1) captures the decreasing returns from performing a single
task, which implies that no one will fully specialize.
Each worker takes the return paid to tasks (wM and wC) as given and chooses an occupa-
tion allocating her time between manual and communication tasks to maximize labor income.
Labor income is given in Equations (4) and (5) for less educated native and immigrant workers
respectively.
wD =( lD)
δ μDwM +( 1− lD)
δ ζDwC. (4)
wF =( 1− d)
h
(lF)




These equations sum the income from performing manual and interactive tasks. The produc-
tivity in each task is speciﬁct ot h et y p eo fw o r k e r( F or D). Notice that in (5) we allow wages of
immigrants to be a fraction (1 − d) ∈ [0,1] of their marginal productivity, allowing for some form
of discrimination or reduced bargaining power relative to natives. This feature does not aﬀect the
relative (or absolute) supply of tasks by immigrants. It only implies that immigrants may earn
lower wages than natives do within a given occupation, which is a feature that we allow in the
estimation and is supported by the data.
By maximizing wages with respect to lj we can identify the equilibrium relative supply of
communication versus manual tasks for natives and immigrants. Equation (6), which depends




, describes the relative task supply for natives (j = D) and immigrants (j = F). Equivalently,























Since each occupation requires a unique allocation of time between manual and communication






in task performance. Equations (6) and (7) can therefore be interpreted
as describing the occupation choice for a worker of type j establishing a unique and invertible
7relationship between an individual’s relative abilities and her occupation.9 The existence of a
continuum of occupations (for values of lj between 0 and 1) allows workers to respond continuously








mj — that is, by moving to an occupation requiring less time devoted to manual tasks,
lj.
In this simpliﬁed model there is no diﬀerentiation of abilities within citizenship groups — all
native workers are endowed with task eﬃciency (ζD, μD), whereas all foreign-born workers have
eﬃciency (ζF, μF). This implies that each native supplies (cD, mD) task units and each immigrant
supplies (cF, mF) so that members from each group will choose a common occupation. Each group
will choose a new occupation, however, if the relative compensation of tasks changes. Hence in our
notation j represents the worker type as well as her occupation as the second fully reveal the ﬁrst10
The aggregate task supply for native and foreign workers will equal the product of individual task




Mj (by multiplying numerator and denominator by Lj), expression (6) also describes the
relative supply of tasks for natives and immigrants.
Equation (8) represents the aggregate relative supply of tasks in the economy obtained by













The term φ(f)=MF/(MF + MD) ∈ (0,1) is the share of manual tasks supplied by foreign-
born workers, and is a simple monotonically increasing transformation of the foreign-born share of
less educated workers11, f = LF/(LF + LD). Hence, the aggregate relative supply of tasks in the
economy is a weighted average of each group’s relative supply, and the weights are closely related
to the share of each group in employment. Substituting (6) for natives and immigrants in (8) and
equating relative supply with relative demand (expressed by (3)) one can solve for the equilibrium




































is a weighted average of the relative skill endowments among natives and
9Empirically, for example, a relative task supply
cj
mj=0.16 corresponds to the occupation “Assembler of Electrical
Equipment.” A relative task supply of 3.12 corresponds to the occupation “Financial Service Salesperson.”
10In a model with heterogeneous abilities (as in Peri and Sparber (2008c)) as well as in the empirical implemen-
tation, there are workers with diﬀerent relative ability
ζj
μj choosing diﬀerent occupations within each group. In that
case the index j can be thought as indexing the worker relative eﬀectiveness as well as their occupation.
11Speciﬁcally: φ
0(f) > 0;φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1.
8immigrants, and it represents an aggregate measure of communication relative to manual ability in





































depends negatively on f and
positively on
ζF





μD, a larger fraction of immigrants decreases the average relative communication skills





for given share of employment would decrease the average relative communication ability of the
workforce.
By substituting the equilibrium wage into the aggregate relative supply for domestic workers,




































































If we assume that workers also spend their entire wage income to consume Y in each period
(there is no capital in the model so we assume no saving and investment), the equilibrium com-
pensation values wH,w M, and wC fully determine the income, task supply, and consumption of
each agent. Hence, the model is a simple general equilibrium static representation of an economy.
2.3 Model Predictions and Empirical Speciﬁcations
It is simple and intuitive to perform some comparative static analyses using the equilibrium ex-









negatively on the share of immigrants in the population (f), an increase in that share has three ef-
fects. First, the return to communication relative to manual tasks increases (Equation (9)), which
in turn implies an increase in the relative supply of communication tasks by natives (Equation











μF , a decrease in that variable produces an increase
in the relative return to communication versus manual tasks, an increase in the native relative
supply of communication versus manual tasks, and a decrease in the overall relative supply of
communication versus manual tasks. Empirically, between 1960 and 2000 the US experienced an
9inﬂow of immigrants with lower
ζF
μF relative to natives.
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium in an economy with native and foreign-born workers, illus-
trating the eﬀects of an increase in the share of immigrants and/or a decrease in their relative
ζF
μF
abilities using relative supply and demand curves. The demand curve is downward sloping and
represents relative marginal task productivity as derived from the production function. Compar-
ative advantage dictates that the relative task supply curve among immigrants is to the left of
that among domestic workers. Aggregate relative supply (represented by the thickest line in the
panel) is a weighted average of the two. The distance of the average supply curve from those of
immigrants and domestic workers is proportional to φ(f)a n d1− φ(f), respectively.














by E0.T h e p o i n t s D0 and F0 along the native and immigrant skill-supply curves identify each
group’s respective initial relative supply of tasks. Either an increase in the foreign-born share
of employment or a decrease in
ζF
μF will shift aggregate supply to the left (the latter also shifts
the supply curve for immigrants). This implies a new equilibrium, E1. The aggregate level of
communication versus manual tasks decreases, thus increasing their relative compensation. Natives
respond rationally by providing more communication versus manual tasks (a move along their
relative skill-supply curve to D1). Hence, a larger share of immigrants among less educated workers
(possibly reinforced by a decrease in their relative communication abilities) pushes less educated
native workers to further exploit their comparative advantage. The economy experiences (i) An
increase in the relative compensation of communication versus manual tasks; (ii) An increase in
natives’ relative supply of these tasks; and (iii) A decrease in the relative supply of communication
versus manual tasks in the aggregate.
In Section 4, we empirically test these three predictions by using decennial (year t) US state
(s) data from 1960-2000. In particular, by log-linearizing the two key equilibrium conditions (10)




















































Each regression includes a non correlated zero-mean disturbance term (εD
st, εTot
st ,a n dεW
st ).
10Time ﬁxed eﬀects (respectively as τD
t , τTOT
t ,a n dτw
t ) account for common time-varying techno-







from Equations (10) and
(11), while τw





from the relative labor demand equation. The state ﬁxed
eﬀects in each expression (denoted αD
s , αTOT
s ,a n dαw
s ) account for variation due to unobserved







The remaining terms in these log-linearized expressions represent our theoretical model’s













. The model’s Equa-
tion (10) predicts γ>0 because a state’s foreign-born share of less-educated employment (fst)












is derived from (11), which predicts γ
TOT < 0 since immigration
causes the overall relative supply of these tasks to fall. Finally, we use Equation (14) to estimate
t h er e l a t i v ew a g ee l a s t i c i t y ,θL, which is predicted to be positive. This speciﬁcation rearranges











st is endogenous, we use the results from our regression of (13) and adopt the share
of immigrants, fst, as an instrument in estimation of (14).
Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 estimate, respectively (12), (13) and (14). Before showing the results,
however, we describe the data and discuss the measures of task supply and task compensation in
Section 3.1, and we address important empirical issues (such as the instrumental variable strategy
adopted and the construction of sector-speciﬁc task demand) in Section 3.2. Readers interested in
the results but not in the details of the empirical implementation can skim over Section 3.1, skip
Section 3.2, and continue to Section 4.
3 Data, Construction of Variables, and Empirical Imple-
mentation
This section describes how we construct measures of task supply in order to test the main im-
plications of the model. The IPUMS dataset by Ruggles et. al. (2005) provides individual-level
data on personal characteristics, employment, wages, immigration status, and occupation choice.
As consistent with the literature, we identify immigrants as those who are born outside of the
United States and were not citizens at birth. To focus on the period of rising immigration and to
use only Census data we consider decennial years from 1960 to 2000.12 We include workers who
were between 18 and 65 years of age, not residing in group quarters, and who worked at least
12We use the 1% IPUMS sample for the 1960 and 1970 Census data, and the 5% IPUMS sample for 1980, 1990
and 2000.
11one week in the year prior to the Census year and at least one hour in the reference week.13 We
also calculate the potential experience of workers assuming that those without a degree started
working at age 17, and those with a diploma started at 19. We then eliminate workers with less
than one year and more than 45 years of experience. Whenever we construct aggregate or average
variables, we weight each individual by his/her personal Census weight, multiplied by the number
of hours he/she worked in a year.14 This allows us to put less weight on part-time workers, and
to create variable values reﬂecting the amount of hourly labor individuals actually supply.
Since the immigrant share of employment varies greatly across US states, we interpret states
as labor markets and adopt them as the econometric unit of analysis.15 O n ec r i t i q u eo ft h i s
approach is that states are open economies, so the eﬀects of immigration in one state could spill
into others through the migration of natives. Section 4.1.6 notes, however, that most of the
literature (including our analysis) ﬁnds little to no evidence that, in the long run, natives respond
to immigration through interstate migration or by exiting employment. Instead, we provide a new
explanation for the observed small wage and employment response to immigration — native-born
workers partly protect themselves from competition with immigrants by specializing in language-
intensive occupations.
3.1 Task Variables
In our theoretical model we argued that individuals of type j choose occupations that are deﬁned
by their manual and communication content. Thus, we can interpret j not only as representing
diﬀerent individual types, but also as identifying diﬀerent occupations. For empirical exercises,
we do not need data describing the (unobservable) share of time spent performing manual and
communication tasks (lj,1−lj)o rt h ee ﬀectiveness of workers in performing these skills (μj or ζj).
Rather, quantitative analysis requires only the eﬀective supply of manual (mj) and communicative
(cj) tasks in each occupation since mj =( lj)
δ μj and cj =( 1− lj)
δ ζj. We assume that our task-
intensity variables exactly capture this eﬀective task-supply.16
By merging occupation-speciﬁc task values with individuals across Census years, we are able
to obtain these task supply measures for natives and immigrants by education level in each state
over time. The US Department of Labor’s O*NET abilities survey provides information on the
13We do not exclude self-employed as long as they report wage income. The exclusion of self-employed did not
noticeably change any result (estimates are available upon request).
14The number of hours worked in a year equals the number of weeks worked in the year (measured by the
IPUMS variable wkswork2 in 1960 and 1970 and wkswork1 from 1980-2000) times the number of hours usually
worked (hrswork2 in 1960 and 1970 and uhrswork subsequently). As wkswork2 and hrswork2 are categorical
variables we attribute to each category the median value of the interval.
15Also see Card (2001, 2007), Lewis (2005), Card and Lewis (2007), Cortes (2008), and Kugler and Yuksel (2008).
16We describe the construction of these variables below, and Table A1 in the Appendix provides cj and mj values
for all occupations j.
12characteristics of occupations.17 Initiated in 2000, this dataset assigns numerical values to describe
the importance of 52 distinct employee abilities (which we refer to as “tasks” or “skills”) required
by each SOC (standard occupation classiﬁcation) occupation. We merge these occupation-speciﬁc
values to individuals in the 2000 Census using the SOC codes. The arbitrary scale of measurement
for the task variables encourages us to convert the values into percentiles. We assume that the
2000 Census is collectively representative of the US workforce, and then re-scale each skill variable
so that it equals the percentile score representing the relative importance of that skill among
all workers in 2000.18 Since Census occupation codes vary across years, we then assign these
O*NET percentile scores to individuals from1 9 6 0t o2 0 0 0u s i n gt h eI P U M Sv a r i a b l eocc1990,
which provides an occupational crosswalk over time. The standardization of skill values between
zero and one should facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of their percentage changes over
time.19
Table 1 lists each of the 52 O*NET variables and organizes them into categories that we use to
construct our manual and communication skill supply indices. In our most “basic” (and restrictive)
deﬁnition of manual skills we average only the variables capturing an occupation’s “Movement
and Strength” requirements. As Table 1 shows, those skills can be further divided into “Limb,
Hand, and Finger Dexterity,” “Body Coordination and Flexibility,” and “Strength.” Similarly,
our basic deﬁnition of communication skills includes measures of oral and written expression and
comprehension.
Some of our analysis employs “extended” deﬁnitions of manual and communication skills so
that all of the 52 O*NET variables fall into one of the two categories. In this analysis, we add
“Sensory and Perception” abilities (i.e. those using the ﬁve senses) to the physical skill group, while
we introduce “Cognitive and Analytical” and “Vocal” abilities to the communication skill group.
The simplicity of our two-skill dichotomy forces us to make a few somewhat arbitrary choices when
trying to ﬁta l lt h eO*NET variables into one of the categories (for instance, cognitive skills do
not relate only to language abilities). While we believe that our basic skill deﬁnitions more closely
manifest the notion of communication and manual skills, the robustness of our empirical results
to the use of our extended deﬁnitions lends support to our framework of summarizing occupations
with just two measures.
To produce the summary statistics in the next section, we calculate the aggregate (US or state-
level) supply of manual skills for less educated immigrants (MF), natives (MD), or both groups of
workers (M) by summing the values of mj across individuals.20 We follow an analogous procedure
for aggregate communication skills (creating CF, CD,a n dC). Average values for states (or the
17We use version 11.0 of the survey, which is publicly available at http://www.onetcenter.org/.
18That is, an occupation with a score of 0.02 for a speciﬁc skill indicates that only 2% of workers in the US in
2000 were using that skill less often.
19See Chiswick and Miller (2007) or Sparber (2008) for alternative uses of O*NET data.
20We also weight mj by individual sample weights (the IPUMS variable PERWT), multiplied by hours worked.
13US) are represented by m or c (with subscripts if appropriate), and are obtained by dividing the
aforementioned aggregate variables by the number of hours worked times the sample weight of the
considered population. That is, mD = MD/LD and mF = MF/LF, for example.
3.1.1 National Trends
This section brieﬂy describes how diﬀerent occupations rank in their use of physical versus lan-
guage skills according to the O*NET task variables, and it presents some preliminary trends
and correlations. Table 2 lists representative occupations at each decile of the communication





distribution. As we might expect, values are highest among
managers, administrators, and clerks, while drivers, electricians, and carpenters score among the
lowest (Table A1 in the Appendix provides
cj
mj values for all occupations j). Table 3 shows the skill
intensity for occupations maintaining the most extreme c
m values (among occupations with more
than 25,000 less educated workers in each year). It also reports the change in the foreign-born
share of workers with a high school degree or less between 1970 and 2000. One striking fact is
that the foreign-born share increased an average of six percentage points between 1970 and 2000
in occupations with high communication versus manual task content, while it gained an average
21 percentage points in those with low c
m values. As we only include less educated workers in the
immigration ﬁgures shown in Table 3, the educational distribution of immigrants cannot explain
this large diﬀerence.
Figure 2 reports the national trend (between 1970 and 2006) in the relative supply of commu-





for less educated natives, recent immigrants (those who have
been in the US ten or fewer years), and long-term immigrants (those residing in the US more
than ten years).21 The graph highlights several important stylized facts. First, in accordance
with the comparative advantage assumption of Section 2.2, the level of C
M provided by native
workers with a high school degree or less has been higher than that of both recent and long-term
immigrants with similar educational attainment. Second, relative skill values are always lowest
among new immigrants. In 2006, communication versus manual task provision among natives was
34% higher than for long-term immigrants, and it was almost double that of new immigrants.
Third, cross-group disparities have been growing over time. Less educated native workers have
increased (if only slightly) their C
M supply between 1970 and 2006, while values have decreased
among foreign-born workers. Altogether, the trends and relationships in Figure 2 do not suggest a
common response of natives and immigrants to modiﬁed relative demand for skills but rather show
increasing specialization of the two groups, consistent with the idea that immigration represented
an exogenous change in relative skill supply.
21Since the variable “Year of Immigration” is not available in 1960, we cannot extend this ﬁgure back to that
year. We provide 2006 American Community Survey (ACS) data for comparison, though it is not part of the
empirical analysis.
14Figure 3 demonstrates that the (total and recent) immigrant share of less educated workers
grew substantially between 1970 and 2006. This, combined with the fact that immigrants’ rela-
tive specialization in communication tasks decreased, implies that in aggregate they signiﬁcantly
decreased the overall value of C
M for the US. If our theory is correct, this should have important
ramiﬁcations for native-born task supply and wage earnings, which we analyze at the state-level.
3.1.2 State-Level Skill Quantities
The empirical analysis of Section 4 assumes that states represent labor markets and can be used to
test the implications of our theory in Section 2. To perform the analysis, we must construct state-





in each Census year between 1960 and 2000. Importantly,
we must ﬁrst clean this data of demographic eﬀects. That is, personal characteristics (such as age,
education, gender, or race) could aﬀect each state’s task supply and correlate with immigration.
Failing to account for this could generate a spurious correlation between the presence of immigrants
and the task supply of natives.
To control for personal characteristics, we ﬁrst regress an individual’s task supply on a set of
dummies capturing experience (44 distinct years of experience indicators), education (an indicator
for having obtained a high school diploma), gender (a female indicator), and race/ethnicity (six
indicators for Black, Hispanic, Native Americans, Chinese, Japanese, and other races). We do
these regressions separately for each Census year and O*NET variable. Next, we subtract an
individual’s predicted task supply from his or her observed value. This residual represents an
individual’s skill “cleaned” of demographic eﬀects. We then compute an individual’s total manual
and communication task supply by averaging the relevant residuals (i.e., by averaging the cleaned
O*NET variables belonging to each skill type as deﬁned in Table 1). Finally, we create state-level







for each state s and
year t by weighting each individual by his or her personal weight (and hours worked).22
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the immigrant share of less educated workers for a state and year






native workers (also in diﬀerences from the overall state average). Panel B simply graphs the
immigrant share and relative task supply in levels for 2000. Both ﬁgures clearly show a strong
and signiﬁcantly positive relationship between the immigrant share of less educated workers and
the communication versus manual skill supply of less educated natives across states. States where
the foreign-born presence grew rapidly between 1960 and 2000 were also those in which natives
(after controlling for demographic characteristics) shifted their supply more toward communication
tasks and away from manual ones. In 2000, there was a strong positive correlation between the
level of relative task supply among natives and the share of immigrants. These correlations
22The cleaning procedure eliminates the cross-state variation of skills due to the demographic features of natives.
However it maintains the national average skill intensity for the group of natives in each year.
15constitute preliminary evidence supporting the prediction of our model that an inﬂow of less
educated immigrants pushes less educated natives to supply more communication skills relative
to manual ones.
3.1.3 State-Level Skill Compensation
The regression speciﬁcation in Equation (14) relating relative skill supply to the relative wages paid
to those skills encounters an immediate challenge in that the returns to skills wM and wC are not
directly observable. However, the theoretical model suggests that since we know the task content
and average wage for each occupation, we can extract a measure of their values. We use two steps
to calculate wM and wC for each state and year. First, we select workers with at most a high
school degree and regress, by year, the logarithm of individual real weekly wages23 on individual
experience, education, gender, nativity (US or foreign), and race characteristics, similar to the
procedure used to clean the skill data in Section 3.1.2. These regressions also include occupation
by state dummies, whose coeﬃcients represent our estimates for the average log-wage, ln( ˜ wjst),
for occupation j, state s, and Census year t after removing individual characteristic eﬀects.24
In the second step, we transform ln( ˜ wjst) into levels and regress ˜ wjst on the occupation-
speciﬁc measures of manual and communication skills (obtained from O*NET)u s i n gw e i g h t e d
least squares. We do this using the basic as well as the extended deﬁnitions of skills described in
T a b l e1 . W et h e na l l o wt h ec o e ﬃcients on the skill variables to vary across states so that they
capture the compensation (price) of manual and communication tasks in each state. By separately
estimating the second stage regression in Equation (15) for each year, we can identify the state
and year-speciﬁc wages, (wM)st and (wC)st, received for supplying manual and communication
tasks.
˜ wjst =( wM)st · mj +( wC)st · cj + εjst (15)
Interpreting mj and cj as the eﬀective supply of manual tasks in occupation j, (as expressed in
the theoretical model), Equation (15) implements the relationships in (4) and (5) to infer the values
of wM and wC in a market (state) from the occupational wages in that market. The fact that we
controlled for nativity in the ﬁrst stage regression (as well as for other individual characteristics)
implies that we allow wages to diﬀer between natives and immigrants by proportional factors (such
as the discrimination eﬀect in Equation (5)). In order to obtain coeﬃcients d wMst and c wCst that
could be interpreted as the weekly compensation of a skill (and therefore always assuming positive
values), and in line with our model, we do not include a constant in (15).
Table A2 in the Appendix shows, for each year, the average estimates (at the national level)
23Real weekly wages are calculated by dividing the yearly salary income by the number of weeks worked in the
year. The nominal ﬁgures are converted into real ﬁgures using the CPI-U deﬂator published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and available at www.bls.gov/cpi.
24Regressions weight each individual by their Census sample weight times hours worked.
16of d wMst and c wCst,t h eR2 values from regressions of (15), and the number of occupation-state
observations used in the estimation. The average compensation to communication tasks was
larger than the compensation to manual tasks in each year except for 1980. While we observe a
drop in the real compensation paid to both tasks between 1980 and 1990 due to the large decrease
in real wages of less educated workers, it is clear that since 1980 the premium (wage diﬀerential)
for communication tasks has increased. Certainly there are other idiosyncratic factors aﬀecting
average occupational wages across states, but the model in (15) explains a signiﬁcant share (30
to 40% in each of the years considered) of the cross-occupation variance in wages. Adopting the
extended deﬁnitions of manual and communication skills does little to alter the explanatory power
of the model in (15), and it does not aﬀect the estimated values of d wMst and c wCst.
Figure 5 shows preliminary evidence for another key prediction of our model. The horizontal
axis again displays the immigrant share of less educated foreign-born workers in 2000, and the











values (this is what drives natives to alter their skill supply). While Section 4.3 will more formally
establish the relationship between immigration and relative task compensation, this preliminary
evidence emphasizes that a correlation (in levels) existed in 2000.
3.2 Additional Empirical Issues
Our basic empirical speciﬁcations in Equations (12), (13) and (14) provide a simpliﬁed examination
of the theoretical model’s predictions. For robustness, the analysis will consider many additional
complications as well. These alternatives require further data construction.
3.2.1 Instrumental Variables
To establish whether correlation between the foreign-born employment share and native-born (or
aggegregate) skill use is causal, we need to ensure that the cross-state variation of less educated
immigrants is mostly driven by supply shifts. One concern is whether unobserved technology
a n dd e m a n df a c t o r s ,w h i c hm a yd i ﬀer across states due to variation in sector composition, have
simultaneously aﬀected the productivity of (demand for) communicative tasks and attracted im-
migrants. To establish causality, we use two sets of instruments that build upon the fact that
documented and undocumented Mexican immigration has represented a large share of the in-
crease in the less educated foreign-born population beginning in the 1970s. This aggregate inﬂow
was largely independent of state-speciﬁc demand shocks and can be exploited as an exogenous
supply shift if we can diﬀerentiate ﬂo w sa c r o s ss t a t e s .
Our ﬁrst instrument for the increase in the share of immigrants among less educated workers
imputes the proportion of Mexican workers within a state based upon their distribution in 1960
17and subsequent national growth rates. This methodology relies upon two facts similarly exploited
by Card (2001) and several other analyses of immigration’s eﬀect on state or city economies.25
First, new immigrants — especially those with li t t l ee d u c a t i o n—t e n dt om o v et ot h es a m ea r e a s
in which previous immigrants from their source country live.26 Second, unlike previous waves
of immigration, a large proportion of immigrants between 1960 and 2000 came from Mexico.
Together, these facts allow us to use the location preferences of Mexicans as factors aﬀecting the
supply of foreign-born workers across states and time that are uncorrelated with state-speciﬁc
changes in demand (productivity).
First, we record the actual share of Mexicans in the employment of state s in 1960 (MEXs,t),
and then assume that the growth rate of the Mexican share of employment between 1960 and year
t was equal across states.27 Thus, Equation (16) imputes shares in year t, where (1 + gMEX)1960−t
is the growth factor of Mexican-born employment nationwide between 1960 and year t,a n d
(1 + gUS)s,1960−t is the growth factor of US-born workers in state s between 1960 and year t.
The identiﬁcation power of the instrument is based on the fact that some states (such as Califor-
nia and Texas) had a larger share of Mexican immigrants in 1960 relative to others. These states
will also have larger imputed shares of Mexicans in 1970 through 2000 and, due to the educational
composition of this group, will have a larger immigrant share among less educated workers.28




Our second set of instruments similarly relies upon the exogenous increase in Mexican immi-
gration but is based upon geography. First, we use the formula for geodesic distance to calculate
the distance of each state’s population center of gravity (available from the 2000 Census) to its
closest section of the Mexican border.29 Since we already control for state ﬁxed eﬀects in the
regressions, we interact the distance variable with four year dummies (from 1970 to 2000). This
captures the fact that distance from the border had a larger eﬀect in predicting the inﬂow of less
educated workers in decades with larger Mexican immigration. Second, we also use a Mexican
border dummy interacted with decade indicators to capture the fact that border states had larger
inﬂows of Mexican workers due to undocumented border crossings. Since illegal immigrants are less
25Also see Cortes (2008), Lewis (2005), Ottaviano and Peri (2007), and Saiz (2003).
26This is due to information networks between immigrants and their country of origin, as well as to the immi-
gration policy of the US. A documented less-educated immigrant is most likely to come to the US to join a family
member.
27The ﬁgures used to impute the Mexican share of employment are not weighted by hours worked.
28The analysis in Patel and Vella (2007) also shows evidence of strong “network” eﬀects aﬀecting the supply of
immigrants. New immigrants are more likely to settle and work in occupations and areas with a large presence
of co-nationals. We do not use the initial occupational distribution to construct the instrument, however, as it is
more likely to be aﬀected by demand factors persisting over the decades.
29We divide the US-Mexico border into 12 sections and calculate the distance between each center of gravity and
each section. Then we choose the shortest distance for each state.
18mobile across states, border states have experienced a particularly large exogenous supply-driven
increase of less educated immigrant workers. Altogether, our second set of instruments includes
both the distance and border variables, each interacted with decade indicators. Essentially, the
use of the geographic instruments is equivalent to a diﬀerence in diﬀerence approach in which the
identifying variation stems from diﬀerences in the inﬂow of Mexicans between states close to and
far from the border in the post-1980 period (when Mexican migration rose dramatically) relative
to previous decades.
3.2.2 Technology and Demand Shifts
Our period of analysis is associated with large changes in production technologies, particularly
in the diﬀusion of information technologies and computer adoption. Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2003) demonstrate that this change had a large eﬀect in shifting demand from routine to non-
routine tasks. Similarly, the increasing importance of advanced services, the demise of manufactur-
ing, and other sector-shifts might have contributed substantially to diﬀerences across states in the
demand for manual and communication tasks. State-speciﬁc technology and/or sector composition
could confound the correlation between immigration and task intensity.
We begin to account for these factors by including the share of workers (with at most a high
school degree) who use a computer at work to control for the diﬀusion of technology across states.
This data is available in the October CPS Supplements in 1984 and 1997, and in the September
CPS Supplement in 2001. We match the 1984 computer data to the 1980 Census data, the 1997
computer-use data to the 1990 Census, and the 2001 computer data to the 2000 Census. We impute
a share of zero for all states in 1960 and 1970 since the personal computer was ﬁrst introduced in
1981.
Our second control accounts more explicitly for the industrial composition of each state in
1960 and its eﬀect on task demand. We create state-speciﬁc indices of communication versus




¢Tech, by assuming that
the occupational composition of industries and industry-speciﬁc employment shocks are uniform
across states. First, we calculate the average physical and language content among all workers for





i,t.N e x t ,w e
calculate industry-level national employment growth since 1960, gi,t. By assuming that industries
grew at their national growth rates regardless of the state in which they are located, we can predict
the employment share of industries within each state and year, d empi,s,t. Finally, we calculate a











19weighted by the predicted employment shares.
d empi,s,t =
Employmenti,s,1960 · (1 + gi,t)
Ind P
i=1


















This section uses the empirical speciﬁcations in (12), (13) and (14) to formally test the relationships
identiﬁed by the theoretical model. Section 4.1 assesses the correlation between the foreign-born
share of less educated workers and the relative supply of tasks by native workers across states.
Section 4.2 tests the eﬀect of immigration on the aggregate supply of relative tasks across states,
and Section 4.3 quantiﬁes the eﬀects of immigration on the relative compensation of manual and
communication tasks.
4.1 The Native-Born Worker Response to Immigration
4 . 1 . 1 I m m i g r a t i o na n dt h eR e l a t i v eT a s kS u p p l yo fN a t i v e s
We begin by estimating Equation (12) using Least Squares, weighting each observation by em-
ployment in the cell (thus accounting for the large variation in labor market size across states) and
clustering standard errors by state. This provides a direct test of our theoretical model by deter-
mining if γ is positive. We also go beyond this test, however, and ascertain whether immigration
has a stronger relationship with the average native-born supply of manual (mD)o rc o m m u n i c a t i o n














M · fst + ε
M
st (20)
Table 4 presents the WLS estimates of γ, γC,a n dγM for diﬀerent samples and diﬀerent variable
deﬁnitions.31 Column (1) uses the basic deﬁnitions of manual and language ability involving the
average of 19 and 4 O*NET variables, respectively (see Table 1), to construct skill supply. The
30Recall that mD = MD
LD and cD = CD
LD.






=l n( cD)st − ln(mD)st,i tm u s tb ea l s ot r u et h a tγ = γC − γM.
20remaining columns use alternative deﬁnitions of skill supply as indicated by column headers.32
Each speciﬁcation uses the full sample of 255 observations (a decennial panel of ﬁfty states plus
the District of Columbia from 1960-2000).
Three important results emerge. First, the estimates of γ strongly uphold our theory. The
coeﬃcients are positive, between 0.25 and 0.35, and always signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
The estimates in column (1) suggest that a one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share
of less educated workers is associated with a 0.34% increase in the relative supply of communication
versus manual tasks among natives. Second, this relative increase is primarily achieved through
a rise in the supply of language skills, rather than a fall in natives’ supply of physical labor. The
estimate of γC in Column (1) implies that a one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share
is associated with a signiﬁcant 0.31% rise in natives’ supply of communication tasks, whereas the
estimates of γM imply that the native supply of manual tasks would only decline by 0.03%, a
value not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. Third, the results are robust — the signiﬁcant correlations
generally do not depend upon the diﬀerent skill deﬁnitions used. Not surprisingly, the basic
deﬁnition is the one producing the strongest and most signiﬁcant results, while the deﬁnition that
includes abilities not strictly related to physical and language skills produces the smallest value of
γ (still a very signiﬁcant 0.25). By adding these tangentially-related abilities, the extended index
may suﬀer from larger measurement error, thus producing an attenuation of the estimated eﬀect.
4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
To argue that our estimates of γ represent the native-born task supply response to immigration,
the regressions in Table 5 perform the two stage least squares counterparts of columns (1) and
(7) of Table 4 by employing the instrumental variables introduced in Section 3.2.1. The ﬁrst
three rows report the two stage least squares estimates of γ, γC,a n dγM, respectively, and the
diﬀerent columns use varied deﬁnitions of manual and communication tasks as indicated by column
headers. Columns (1) and (2) use the imputed share of Mexicans as an instrument for the foreign-
born employment share. Columns (3) and (4) instrument with geographic variables. Columns (5)
and (6) use both sets of instruments together.
The two-stage least squares results in Table 5 are extremely robust to the set of instruments
used and conﬁrm the OLS conclusions of Table 4. The estimates of γ are always positive and very
signiﬁcant. They now range between 0.33 and 0.38. F-tests reveal that the instruments strongly
explain the endogenous variable (fst), while regressions using all available instruments pass the
test for the over-identifying restrictions.33
32The exact variables included in each sub-group can be seen in Table 1.
33The value reported in the second to last row is the χ2 test statistic under the null hypothesis that none of
the instruments appear in the second stage regression. The degrees of freedom are given by the diﬀerence between
the number of instruments and endogenous variables. We have one endogenous variable and either eight or nine
instruments: four distance-decade interactions, four border-decade interactions, and the imputed share of Mexican
21Ultimately, we prefer the estimates of Speciﬁcation (5) since the O*NET variables comprising
the skill data most closely mirror our communication and language skills of interest. According
to those estimates, natives respond to increases in immigration by signiﬁcantly raising their com-
munication task supply by 0.33% for each one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share
of less educated workers (this ﬁgure is similar to those of all other speciﬁcations). At the same
time, they decrease the supply of manual tasks by 0.04% for each percentage-point increase in the
foreign-born share. Note that the magnitude of the communication task response is much bigger
than that of the manual response for all speciﬁcations. The similarity of the coeﬃcients in Tables 4
and 5, and the fact that the point estimates are slightly larger in the 2SLS regressions, strengthens
our conviction that the immigration shock was largely an exogenous shift in the relative supply of
skills at the state level to which native workers responded.
4.1.3 Controls for Demand Shifts
State-level technology and sector-driven changes in task intensity could confound baseline restults.
The regressions in Table 6 control for these factors. Regressions (1) and (4) include a variable mea-
suring the intensity of computer use in a state, measured as described in Section 3.2.2. Columns






s,t , as described in Section 3.2.2. Columns (3) and (6) include both technology variables.
The ﬁrst row of Table 6 reports the estimate of γ. Our control variables usually have a
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient with the expected sign — computer adoption is associated with a higher
provision of communication versus manual tasks among natives, while our constructed sector-
driven demand shifts are positively related to the actual changes in relative tasks. Importantly,
the inclusion of these variables leaves the estimates of γ extremely signiﬁcant, and they range
between 0.34 and 0.51. When we include both controls, the native task specialization response to
immigration seems even stronger than our prior estimates (between 0.44% and 0.51% for a one
percentage-point rise in the share of foreign-born labor).
The last two rows of Table 6 decompose the impact of immigration into its eﬀect on the supply
of manual and interactive tasks. In all cases the positive impact on the supply of interactive
skills (between 0.34 and 0.43) is larger and more signiﬁcant than the negative eﬀect on physical
ones (between -0.08 and 0.00). Altogether, the results of this section continue to provide evidence
for increasing task-specialization, even after accounting for the state-speciﬁc technological shifts
occurring over those decades. The relative supply of communication versus manual skills among
natives increases by roughly 0.40% for each one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share
of less educated workers.
workers. The last row reports the probability of obtaining the observed value of the test statistic or higher under
the null. We cannot reject the null at any level of signiﬁcance, so the assumption of instrument exogeneity stands.
See Wooldridge (2002).
224.1.4 Impact on Previous Immigrants and Highly-Educated Natives
Our model’s prediction for the wages of less educated native workers employs two implicit simplify-
ing assumptions. First, we assume long-term immigrants are somewhat similar to new immigrants
and diﬀerent from native workers in that, relative to natives, they also have a comparative ad-
v a n t a g ei nm a n u a lt a s k s .T h i sa l l o w su st og r o u pn e wa n dl o n g - t e r mi m m i g r a n t st o g e t h e ri no u r
empirical analysis. Second, we assume that highly-educated natives are imperfect substitutes with
all less educated workers, and that their relative task supply is not aﬀected by the presence of less
educated immigrants. In this section we test the validity of these two assumptions.
Figure 2 shows that while immigrants’ comparative advantage in manual tasks decreases with
the duration of US residency (as immigrants become more similar to US-born workers), long-term
immigrants still supply more manual versus communication tasks than natives do. This similarity
between new and long-term immigrants may be the reason that many authors ﬁnd a larger eﬀect of
immigration on the wages of previous immigrants than on natives (see Card (2001) and Ottaviano
and Peri (2008)). In the context of our model, the substitutability of skills among these groups
implies that foreign-born workers will experience only a small (if any) reallocation of task supply
in response to an inﬂow of new immigrants. They therefore experience more wage competition
with new entrants.
Table 7 reports the estimated coeﬃcients from regressions similar to (12), (19), and (20) but
where the dependent variable measures the task supply of less educated long-term (LT)i m m i g r a n t s
rather than natives. Column (1) shows the WLS estimates, while Columns (2) to (4) show the 2SLS
estimates using imputed Mexicans, geographic variables, or both sets of variables as instruments.
Though the point-estimates show that long-termi m m i g r a n t sa l s oh a daw e a kt e n d e n c yt or e s p o n d
to immigration by moving away from manual tasks and into communication tasks, the magnitude
of the response is small. Moreover, the large standard errors imply that the estimates are not
signiﬁcant at standard levels of conﬁdence. Thus, the empirics concur with the predictions of
our model. Though long-term immigrants are becoming more like natives in their skill use, their
response to immigration is small and less signiﬁcant, making them especially vulnerable to wage
competition with new immigrants.
The second simpliﬁcation adopted in our model is that highly-educated workers (those with
some college education) are not closely substitutable with less educated workers. Instead, they
perform unique production tasks and constitute a separate input in production. Thus we assume
that workers with college experience supply analytical (or cognitive) tasks that are not aﬀected
by less educated immigrants.
To justify this assumption, we ﬁrst note that highly-educated workers supply fewer manual
relative to communication tasks than less educated workers do. The average value of the manual
supply index for workers with some college education is half of the average among those with a high
23school education or less, while the highly-educated supply of communication tasks is double that
of less educated workers. Second, we analyze whether the relative supply of analytical versus (oral
and written) communication tasks by more-educated natives is in any way aﬀected by the inﬂow
of less educated immigrants. We also test whether the supply of manual tasks by highly-educated
n a t i v e si sa ﬀected by immigration.
T h er e s u l t sc a nb es e e ni nT a b l e8 . T h ed e p e n d e nt variable is the average supply (by state
and year) of tasks measured among highly-educated natives, while the explanatory variable is the
immigrant share of less educated workers in the state and year. Since the inﬂow of highly-educated
immigrants may aﬀect the task-supply of natives and may be correlated with the inﬂow of less
educated ones, we control for the immigrant share of highly-educated workers as well. Column (1)
in Table 4 reports the WLS estimates. Speciﬁcations (2) to (4) report the 2SLS estimates using,
alternatively, imputed Mexicans and distance from the border (column 2), all geographic variables
(column 3), or the two sets of variables together (column 4) as instruments. While the standard
errors are large, the regressions clearly indicate that there is no eﬀect of less educated immigration
on the relative supply of communication versus analytical tasks among highly-educated natives.
They also indicate that immigration does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the already small supply of manual
tasks among highly-educated natives.
The checks within this section support the simplifying assumptions of our model. Perhaps more
importantly, they also show that the large and signiﬁcant impact of less educated immigrants on
task specialization of less educated natives (shown i nT a b l e5 )i sn o tt h er e s u l to fag e n e r i cp o s i t i v e
correlation between immigration in a state and thec h a n g ei nt a s ks p e c i a l i z a t i o ni nt h a ts t a t e .
Long-term immigrants and highly-educated native sr e s p o n dm u c hl e s st oi m m i g r a t i o na m o n gl e s s
educated workers by reallocating tasks.
4.1.5 Impact across Demographic Groups
The results in Tables 4-6 assumed a homogenous response among US-born workers with a high
school education or less. Our approach, however, allows us to identify the eﬀect of immigration
on the task specialization of speciﬁc demographic groups of less educated native workers. If γ
varies across these groups, then the wage implications of immigration on those groups will vary
as well. Table 9 compares estimates of γ, γC,a n dγM for groups bifurcated by race (Column 1),
gender (Column 2), age (Column 3), and education (Column 4). For each comparison, “Group 1”
represents those earning lower wages (blacks, women, younger workers, and workers without a high
school diploma). Except for women, individuals in Group 1 were also more specialized in manual
than communication tasks and hence more vulnerable to job competition with immigrants. The
ﬁrst three rows report the 2SLS estimates of γ, γC,a n dγM (using all instruments) for Group 1,
and the remaining rows report the same coeﬃcients for Group 2.
24Each of the eight native-born groups in Table 9 responds to immigration by shifting their
specialization from manual tasks to communication tasks. The shift was signiﬁcant in six cases,
and the increase in supply of communication skills was more signiﬁcant and larger than the decrease
in supply of physical tasks for all eight groups. Interestingly, for each comparison the native group
that was more at risk to competition with immigrants (due to a larger reliance upon manual task
performance) also exhibited a greater skill response. Men increased their relative skill supply by
0.26% for every percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share, while women only increased
theirs by 0.11%. Young workers and those without a high school diploma also signiﬁcantly shifted
their relative supply (γ =0 .34), while old workers and those with a diploma did not. This is
not surprising since young workers have greater occupational mobility (older workers have very
low rates of occupational change), and workers with extremely low educational attainment are
potentially more threatened by immigrants.
Most strikingly, black workers responded to immigration by changing their relative task spe-
cialization three times more than non-black workers did (γ =0 .63 versus γ =0 .20). Blacks were
much more specialized in manual tasks in comparison to non-blacks in 1960 and were more suscep-
tible to competition with immigrants. The strong response among blacks in moving toward more
language-intensive occupations should, at least in part, have shielded them from large negative
wage eﬀects.34
4.1.6 Native Employment Response
Our analysis ﬁnds that the relative supply of communication versus manual tasks among natives
rises in response to increased immigration. We believe that this is likely due to a form of occu-
pational upgrading. One potential alternative, however, is that immigration has simply displaced
native workers in physically intensive jobs, leaving only those in language intensive ones. That is,
immigrants may have had a negative employment eﬀect on native workers.
Most regional analyses ﬁnd that immigration generates little to no native employment eﬀect.
In a recent note (Peri and Sparber (2008a)), we argue that to obtain an unbiased estimate of the
potential displacement eﬀect across states (or any geographical unit), one should perform 2SLS













This model regresses the inter-Census change in native employment (∆LD) on the change in
foreign-born employment (∆LF). Eﬀective instruments should avoid “booming region” eﬀects
34We believe that the impact of immigration on sub-groups of American workers — and blacks in particular —
is worthy of further analysis. Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2006) presents an alternative analysis of the eﬀect of
immigrants on black workers.
25(which would induce positive correlation due to unobserved positive regional shocks). The pa-
rameter η then identiﬁes the eﬀect of immigration on native employment. A signiﬁcantly negative
value implies displacement. Using our 1960-2000 state data we estimate a non-signiﬁcant positive
value of η e q u a lt o0 . 3 6( s t a n d a r de r r o ro f0 . 4 0 )u s i n gW L S ,a n dan o n - s i g n i ﬁcant positive value
of 0.31 (with a standard error of 0.50) using 2SLS and all the instruments from Section 4.1.2.
Several previous studies that use speciﬁc a t i o n sa k i nt o( 2 1 )a l s ot e n dt oﬁnd zero or small
positive eﬀects. Cortes (2008) uses a variant of (21) in levels to analyze the link between immi-
gration and employment of less educated workers across 25 US metropolitan areas between 1980
and 2000. She ﬁnds a positive OLS estimate around 0.20 and an IV value near 0.05. Card (2001),
who uses population growth in a city-skill group cell as the dependent variable and the inﬂow rate
of immigrants in the same cell as the explanatory variable, always ﬁnds positive and sometimes
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the native population (around 0.10). His subsequent IV estimates (using the
shift-share instrument to impute the number of immigrants in a cell) often ﬁnd results similar
to those of his OLS regressions. Ottaviano and Peri (2007) aggregate individuals from all skill
levels within a state and estimate an impact of immigration on native employment between -0.3
and 0.3 that is never signiﬁcant (standard errors around 0.3). Card and Lewis (2007) estimate
the eﬀect of low skilled Mexican immigrants on native employment. Their Table 6 results ﬁnd an
eﬀect between 0 and 0.5 that is rarely signiﬁcant. Card’s (2007) Speciﬁcation (2) adopts the total
(immigrant and native) change in the less educated population (or employment) as the dependent
variable. His estimated coeﬃcient implies a value of η slightly larger than zero.
In sum, previous analyses of immigration have uncovered a puzzling result — immigration
simultaneously generates only small wage eﬀects and no employment eﬀects for natives. We
believe our article provides an explanation. Native workers adjust through occupation upgrading
and task specialization, thereby decreasing their vulnerability to immigration.
4.2 Immigration and Total Task Supply
The regression speciﬁcation in (13) provides a test of the equilibrium condition in (11), which
argues for a negative relationship between immigration and aggregate relative supply of commu-
nication versus manual tasks in a state. If true, the parameter γ
TOT will be negative. (This is the
mechanism that alters the relative compensation of tasks and then changes the relative supply
among natives as shown above). We can also test, however, whether immigration aﬀects the aver-
age amount of communication (c)a n dm a n u a l( m) tasks supplied in equilibrium by running two
separate regressions with ln(c)st and ln(m)st as dependent variables. Analogous to the speciﬁca-
tions in (19) and (20), we call these coeﬃcients γC
TOT and γM






the supply of physical and language skills using the individual supply of tasks among natives and
26immigrants.35




last three rows show the F-test of signiﬁcance for the instruments in the ﬁrst stage and the test
of over-identifying restrictions. Manual and communication tasks are measured using varied sets
of O*NET variables, with the basic deﬁnitions represented in columns 1 and 2. Each WLS (odd
columns) and 2SLS (even columns) regression exhibits negative estimates of γ
TOT,a n dt h e ya r e
signiﬁcant in the majority of the cases. The weaker and less signiﬁcant estimates, moreover, are
those obtained when using the extended and less precise deﬁnitions of skills. This conﬁrms the
prediction of our model. The point estimate of our preferred speciﬁcation (column 2) in which the
basic skill deﬁnitions are applied and all instruments are used implies that a one percentage-point
rise in the foreign-born share increases the average supply of manual tasks in the state by 0.05%
and decreases the average supply of communication tasks by 0.10%.
4.3 Immigration and the Rate of Return to Task Performance
The regression speciﬁcation in Equation (14) tests the last important condition of our model —
obtained from the relative demand for skills — which argues that by increasing the relative supply
of skills in a state, immigration reduces their relative rate of return. In this section, we estimate
the relative compensation response to a state’s changing task composition. Exogenous shifts in the
overall relative supply of physical versus language skills across states identify the coeﬃcient 1
θL,
where θL represents the elasticity of substitution between the tasks. Since exogenous immigration
changes will aﬀect the aggregate relative supply of skills, we employ the foreign-born share of
workers and its exogenous determinants as instruments in 2SLS speciﬁcations.
We acquire estimates for returns paid to communication (d wMst)a n dm a n u a l( c wCst)t a s k sb y
state and year according to the methodology in Section 3.1.3 and and then substitute those values
into Equation (14) to estimate − 1
θL. Table 11 reports the results as well as their implied elasticity
of substitution (θL) found using the basic (columns 1 to 4) and extended (columns 5 to 8) task
variable deﬁnitions. We estimate (14) ﬁrst by weighted least squares and then with the imputed
Mexicans and geographic variables as instruments. The instruments are relatively powerful when
used together (F-statistic above 10). The WLS estimates of − 1
θL are around -0.7, while the 2SLS
estimates range between -1.4 and -1.5. Each is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Altogether, the 2SLS estimates imply that the share of foreign-born workers signiﬁcantly in-
creases the relative compensation paid to communication versus manual tasks, thus validating a
key mechanism in our model. The 2SLS results in Table 11 suggest that the elasticity of sub-
stitution (θL) ranges between 0.63 (2SLS estimates) and 1.42 (WLS estimates). Manual and
35We perform separate ﬁrst-stage regressions for foreign-born workers to calculate skill supplies cleaned of demo-
graphic eﬀects similar to the process used for native skill supply discussed in Section 3.1.2.
27communication tasks have a signiﬁcant degree of complementarity. These ﬁgures are comparable
to commonly estimated values for the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital (usually
near 1), or between workers of diﬀerent education levels (σ, which fall between 1.5 and 2).36
5S i m u l a t e d E ﬀects of Immigration on Real Wages, 1990-
2000
Our empirical analysis suggests that to understand the wage implications of immigration, simula-
tions must account for the adjustment in native-born task supply. Hence we can use our model,
production parameters (particularly σ and θL), and the estimated eﬀe c to fi m m i g r a t i o no nn a t i v e -
born task supply to recover the full impact of immigration (at all education levels) on the average
wage of natives across US states.
Since the equilibrium prices of factors and intermediate goods are equal to their marginal
productivity from (1) and (2), we can derive the change in wages paid to highly-educated workers
(wH) in response to immigration (among both high and low education workers) as expressed in




is the income share paid to highly-educated labor and (1 − κH)























To obtain the eﬀect of immigration on wages paid to less educated natives, however, we must











tasks and then weight those changes by the initial
(pre-immigration) average task supply of natives (mD and cD).37 Second, we need to account for
the change in the eﬀective supply of natives’ manual and communication tasks due to immigration
(∆mD and ∆cD). The wage impact of this reallocation of tasks equals (∆mD)wM +( ∆cD)wC.
Altogether, Equation (23) expresses the net eﬀects of total immigration on average wages paid to






















wD | {z }
Second Channel
(23)
Importantly, there are two reasons why this model predicts a mitigated wage eﬀect (that may
36See Katz and Murphy (1992) or Angrist (1995).
37Equations (27) and (28) in the Appendix A report the derived expressions for ∆wM
wM and ∆wC
wC . The expressions
are aﬀected by inﬂows of both high and low education labor.
28even be positive) when compared to models that assume perfect substitution between natives and






to the increased supply of manual skills from immigrants is negative and larger in absolute value
than the impact on
∆wC
wC (which may be positive for complementarity reasons), it is weighted by
the relative task supply of natives. This weight is smaller than the relative supply of the average
individual, because the average includes foreign-born workers. Hence, the negative contribution
from that term (labeled as “First Channel” in Equation (23)) is smaller for less educated natives
than it is for the average less educated worker. Second, the (theoretically and empirically) pre-
dicted reallocation of tasks implies that ∆mD < 0a n d∆cD > 0 so that if the communication




wD (both conditions are
theoretically and empirically true), then the term labeled “Second Channel” in Expression (23)
would positively contribute to the average wage paid to domestic less educated workers.
Altogether, Equations (22) and (23) report the wage consequences of immigration on highly-
educated and less educated workers after accounting for the eﬀects incurred both within and across
education groups. In the next section, we use our model and estimates to simulate the change in
wages caused by observed US immigration ﬂows (at all education levels) between 1990 and 2000.
F i r s tw ee s t i m a t et h ee ﬀects for highly-educated workers (from Equation (22)). Next we calculate
the change in the rate of return to manual and communication tasks (from Equations (27) and
(28) in the Appendix), and then combine those results with the estimates of ∆mD and ∆cD in
Equation (23) to ﬁnd the overall eﬀect of immigration on average wages paid to less educated
natives.
5.1 Eﬀect on the Average less educated US-Born Worker
Table 12 reports the simulated eﬀects of immigrant ﬂows between 1990 and 2000 at the national
level (last row) and for the ten states with the highest immigrant share of less educated labor in
2000 (listed alphabetically). The ﬁrst two columns report the increase in foreign-born employment








, respectively. Notice that less educated
immigration grew more rapidly than more-educated immigration did for all but two reported states
(New Jersey and Florida). For Arizona and Texas, growth among less educated foreign workers
was more than three times greater than that of their more-educated counterparts. Except for
those states, however, immigrant growth disparities were not large. Flows were fairly balanced
at the US level, as immigrants increased employment of more-educated workers by 6% and less
educated workers by 9%.

















29immigration. We assume a value of σ =1 .75 that is in the middle of the range of estimates usually
found in the literature (1.5−2.0),38 and we set θL = 1, a value close to the average of our estimates
in Table 11. Since the inﬂow of highly-educated immigrants was usually smaller than the inﬂow of
less educated ones, the simulated wage eﬀect on people with college experience is usually positive
(a gain of 0.6% at the national level). The change in returns to communication versus manual
tasks caused by immigration is clearly more important for understanding the eﬀects of immigration
on less educated workers. In California, for instance, the compensation to communication skills
performed by less educated workers increased by 0.3%, while the compensation paid for manual
skills decreased by 8.4%. In Arizona, the return to communication tasks decreased by only 1%,
while the wage paid for manual tasks decreased by a whopping 14.2%. Nationally, the return to
communication skills increased 1.2%, while the manual return decreased by 2.8%.
The ﬁnal three columns of Table 12 highlight the ultimate wage consequences of immigration
for less educated native-born workers. Column (6) reports the eﬀect on average wages before ac-
counting for any shift in domestic task supply or for diﬀerences in the relative supply of tasks. That
is, these ﬁgures are useful for identifying the counter-factual wage eﬀects identiﬁed by models that
assume perfect substitutability between native and foreign-born workers of similar educational
attainment.39 Column (8), by comparison, reports the wage eﬀects for less educated natives ac-
counting for the reallocation of tasks following immigration according to Equation (23).40 Column
(7) provides the diﬀerence between these values. Thus, this column illustrates the diﬀerence be-
tween the wage eﬀects estimated in our model of comparative advantage versus a traditional model
of homogeneous labor.
By specializing in language skill-intensive occupations, less educated natives reduce wage losses
due to immigration. At the national level, specialization causes a reduction in this loss of almost
one percentage-point, from an already low value of -1.2% to an ultimate loss of just -0.3%. In states
with large immigrant ﬂows (such as California, Arizona, and Nevada), task reallocation reduces
the wage loss by around 2.4 percentage-points. Specialization changes the eﬀect of immigration
on less educated natives from negative to positive values in two of our reported states.
State-level averages still conceal a large degree of variation in wage eﬀects across occupations.
Columns (4) and (5) illustrate that immigration is more likely to harm workers who did not
move from physical to language-intensive jobs. For instance, less educated Texas workers in
38See Katz and Murphy (1992), Johnson (1997), and Goldin and Katz (2007).
39Note that before accounting for the specialization adjustment, immigration would have caused a wage loss of
1.2% for less-educated workers. As emphasized repeatedly in Ottaviano and Peri (2008), this relatively moderate
consequence is due to the roughly balanced ﬂow of immigrants across education groups (after merging the highly
substitutable workers with no degree and those with a high school diploma together).
40We compute the values of ∆cD and ∆mD by multiplying the change in the foreign-born share of each state
between 1990 and 2000 by the average response of communication and manual task supply to immigration found
in Column (6) of Table 5 (respectively +0.33 and -0.00). The resulting values are elasticities that, when multiplied
by the initial average values of task supply, equal ∆cD and ∆mD.
30occupations requiring only manual skills would have lost 8.8% of their wage, while workers in jobs
only demanding language skills would have experienced no wage change. This demonstrates that
less educated natives who have been able to protect themselves from the negative wage eﬀects of
immigration are primarily those who have chosen jobs with higher communication requirements
relative to manual requirements, and additionally are those who, due to immigration, were pushed
to seek these occupations at higher rates.
5.2 Implied Native-Immigrants Elasticity
Though we have emphasized the native-born wage eﬀects of immigration, the ﬁgures in column (6)
o fT a b l e1 2r e p r e s e n tt h ew a g ec o n s e q u e n c ef o rany less educated worker who possess skills that are
perfectly substitutable with immigrants and who fails to respond to new labor ﬂows by changing
occupations. Thus, column (6) also illustrates the change in wages paid to previously established
immigrant workers caused by new immigration. By extension, Column (7) can then be interpreted
as the percentage change in the relative wage between less educated natives and foreign-born
workers. If we divide those values by the percentage change in relative hours worked (LF/LD), we
can obtain the inverse elasticity of substitution between immigrant and native workers implied by
our model. This provides a useful benchmark to compare with direct measures of this elasticity,
such as those recently provided by Ottaviano and Peri (2008).
The logarithmic (percentage) change in LF/LD across the states listed in Table 12 ranges be-
tween 0.33 (33%) in Hawaii and 0.94 (94%) in Arizona, with several values above 0.60 (Texas,
the District of Columbia, Illinois, and Nevada). On average, hours worked by less educated immi-
grants relative to less educated natives increased by 0.60 (60%). The resulting inverse elasticity
of substitution between natives and immigrants ranges between 0.021 and 0.051 with an average
of 0.03, thus implying an elasticity between 20 and 47 with an average of 33.
Our values are similar to those estimated by Ottaviano and Peri (2008). In particular, their
preferred speciﬁcations (pooling men and women) report values between 0.024 and 0.047 (signif-
icant at the 1% level). Hence, the mechanism illustrated in this paper can explain most of their
estimated imperfect substitutability. On the surface, an average inverse elasticity of 0.03 looks
small. Given that relative supply has changed by as much as 60 to 90%, however, our estimates
suggest a 2 to 3% change in the relative native-immigrant wage that favors natives. This relative
eﬀect is large enough to nearly eliminate the potential wage loss among natives, and it implies
that less educated foreign-born workers are theo n e sw h oe x p e r i e n c em o s to ft h en e g a t i v ew a g e
consequences of new immigration.
316 Conclusions
The eﬀects of immigration on the wages paid to native-born workers with low levels of educational
attainment depend upon two critical factors. The ﬁrst is whether immigrants take jobs similar
to those of native workers or instead take diﬀerent jobs due to inherent comparative advantages
between native and foreign-born employees in performing particular productive tasks. The second
is whether US-born workers respond to immigration and adjust their occupation choices in order
to shield themselves from competition with immigrant labor.
This paper provides a simple theoretical framework and new empirical evidence to analyze
these issues. We argue that production combines diﬀerent labor skills. Immigrants with little edu-
cational attainment have a comparative advantage in manual and physical tasks, while natives of
similar levels of education have a comparative advantage in communication and language-intensive
tasks. Native and foreign-born workers specialize accordingly. When immigration generates large
increases in manual task supply, the relative compensation paid to communication skills rises,
thereby rewarding natives who progressively move to language-intensive jobs.
Our empirical analysis used O*NET data to measure the task content of occupations in the
United States between 1960 and 2000. We ﬁnd strong evidence supporting the implications of
our theoretical model. On average, less educated immigrants supplied more manual relative to
communication tasks than natives supplied. In states with large immigrant ﬂows among the less
educated labor force, native workers shifted to occupations more intensive in language skills and
less intensive in physical ones. However, the total relative supply of communication versus manual
tasks is lower in states with high levels of immigration. This implies that immigrants more than
compensate for the change in skill supply among natives, and it ensures that manual task-intensive
occupations earn lower wages in those states.
Since native-born workers respond to inﬂows of immigrant labor by specializing in occupations
demanding language skills, the relative supply of communication tasks by the average US-born
worker has increased signiﬁcantly in recent decades. As a consequence, immigration-induced
wage losses among less educated native workers are signiﬁcantly smaller than the losses predicted
by models in which less educated native and foreign-born labor is perfectly substitutable. In
particular, we estimate that immigration only reduced average real wages paid to less educated
US-born workers by 0.3% between 1990 and 2000. Without task specialization that loss would
have been 1.2%.
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To isolate the eﬀect of immigration on wages, ﬁrst substitute (2) into the production function (1)































Highly-educated workers earn the unit price of the intermediate good they produce. The
logarithmic diﬀerential of (26) directly measures immigration’s eﬀect on highly-educated workers
as expressed in (22).
Wages paid to less educated workers are divided into their task components. The ﬁrst order







































































Using Equations (27) and (28) we can express the wage eﬀect for less educated workers at

























Note that (29) represents the average manual and communication wage eﬀects weighted by
their respective initial supplies. The total eﬀect of immigration on the average, native-born, less
educated worker accounting for (29) as well as for the eﬀect of changing specialization is given by
Equation (23) in the main text.
To derive
∆YL
YL , ﬁr s tn o t et h a ts i n c eYL is produced under perfect competition using services of
less educated workers, we know the total income generated in sector YL will be distributed to less









37e d u c a t e dw o r k e r sa si nE q u a t i o n( 3 0 ) .
PLYL = wLL = wMM + wCC (30)
This allows us to relate changes in the production of YL to small changes in inputs M and C
as in Equation (34). The formal proof hinges only on constant returns to scale to M and C in (2).
First, re-write Equation (34) by dividing by PLYL. Then take the total diﬀerential with respect


































dC . Distributing the























































(Euler Condition). Constant returns also imply that the second derivatives (with respect to M or
C), multiplied by the shares M
YL and C
YL, sum to zero. Hence the two terms in brackets equal zero






















wLL as (1−κM). We then use ∆,















Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Skill Types, Sub-Types, and Variables from O*NET  
Type of Skill  Definition  Skill Sub-Type  O*NET Variables 
Limb, Hand, and Finger 
Dexterity 
Arm-Hand Steadiness; Manual Dexterity; Finger Dexterity; 
Control Precision; Multilimb Coordination; Response 
Orientation; Rate Control; Reaction Time; Wrist-Finger 
Speed; Speed of Limb Movement 
Body Coordination and 
Flexibility  
Extent Flexibility; Dynamic Flexibility; Gross Body 




Strength  Static Strength; Explosive Strength; Dynamic Strength; 
Trunk Strength; Stamina 
General Perception  Perceptual Speed; Spatial Orientation; Visualization; 
Selective Attention; Time Sharing 
Visual Perception  Near Vision; Far Vision; Visual Color Discrimination; Night 









Skills  Hearing Perception  Hearing Sensitivity; Auditory Attention; Sound Localization 
Oral  Oral Comprehension;  Oral Expression  Basic Definition: 
Oral and Written   Written  Written Comprehension;  Written Expression 
Cognitive and Analytical  Fluency of Ideas; Originality; Problem Sensitivity; Category 
Flexibility; Mathematical Reasoning; Number Facility; 
Deductive Reasoning; Inductive Reasoning; Information 




Skills  Extended 
Definition:  
Oral and Written 
plus Cognitive, 
Analytical, and 
Vocal Skills  Vocal   Speech Recognition; Speech Clarity 
 



















Financial managers  0.227  0.833  1.00  0.09 
Managers and administrators, n.e.c.  0.345  0.686  0.90  0.10 
Managers of food-serving and lodging establishment  0.648  0.790  0.80  0.25 
Police, detectives, and private investigators  0.794  0.709  0.70  0.04 
Retail sales clerks  0.512  0.298  0.60  0.13 
Hairdressers and cosmetologists  0.620  0.296  0.50  0.23 
Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers  0.877  0.288  0.40  0.12 
Carpenters 0.928  0.250  0.31  0.19 
Assemblers of electrical equipment  0.677  0.114  0.21  0.23 
Textile sewing machine operators  0.731  0.085  0.10  0.45 
Drywall installers  0.657  0.003  0.00  0.30 
 
 
Note:  Authors’ calculations are based upon O*NET task definitions and the 2000 Census. The occupations included in this table are those at each 
decile of the 2000 distribution when workers are ranked according to their communication versus manual task intensity. The basic manual index 
represents the average intensity of 19 measures of several physical abilities (listed in Table 1). The basic communication task index represents the 
average of four measures that capture oral and written expression and comprehension (also listed in Table 1). Both are standardized to be between 0 




Occupations, Relative Task Intensity, and the Foreign-Born Share of Less-Educated Employment 
 







Born Share of Less-
Educated Employment
1970-2000 
Four Occupations with Highest Communication/Manual Values 
Financial managers  0.83  0.23  0.999  +5.7% 
Managers of properties and real estate  0.74  0.21  0.997  +1.8% 
Editors and reporters  0.87  0.27  0.991  +12.2% 
Operations and systems researchers and analysts 0.64  0.20  0.990  +4.1% 
Four Occupations with Lowest Communication/Manual Values 
Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners  0.72  0.72  0.021  +20.6% 
Furniture and wood finishers  0.72  0.72  0.021  +13.4% 
Roofers and slaters  0.64  0.64  0.020  +26.4% 
Drywall installers  0.72  0.72  0.006  +24.2% 
  
Note:  Authors’ calculations based upon O*NET task definitions and Census 1970-2000. The occupations included are those with more than 25,000 
employees in each year. Only less-educated wage-earning employees between 18 and 65 years old and not living in group quarters are considered. The 
basic manual index is constructed averaging 19 measures that capture the intensity of several physical abilities. The basic communication task index is 
constructed averaging four measures that capture oral and written expression and comprehension. Both are standardized to be between 0 and 1. The 












Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Native Supply of Tasks, U.S. States 1960-2000; Least Squares Estimates  
Workers with a High School Degree or Less, Controlling for Individual Characteristics in the Construction of Aggregate Skills 
 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Communication Definition:  Basic  Oral  Written  Basic  Extended  Extended  Basic 
              
Manual Definition:  Basic  Limb, Hand, 
Finger  Body Strength  Extended  Basic  Extended 















































  255 255 255  255  255  255  255 
 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. To construct the average manual mD 
and communication cD skill supply by native workers in a state-year, we first run individual regressions of a native’s manual (or communication) tasks supply (in 
each Census year) on age, experience, gender, and race dummies, weighting each observation by hours worked. We then subtract the predicted supply from the 
observed value. The state average (hours-weighted) of this “cleaned” (residual) supply represents the values cD and mD after controlling for individual demographic 
characteristics, and CD/MD is their ratio. The explanatory variable is the immigrant share of less-educated labor hours worked in the state and year.  The units of 
observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000). All regressions include state and year fixed 
effects. The method of estimation is weighted least squares. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state.  






Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Native Supply of Tasks, U.S. States 1960-2000; 2SLS Estimates  
Workers with a High School Degree or Less, Controlling for Individual Characteristics in the Construction of Aggregate Skills 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
   Imputed Mexican Share IVs  Proximity to Mexico IVs  All IVs Together 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Communication Definition:  Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic  Basic 
Manual Definition:  Basic Extended Basic Extended Basic  Extended 





















































Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
N.A. N.A.  11.4 12.7 12.5  13.2 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of Exogeneity 
of Instruments  
N.A. N.A.  0.13 0.09 0.14  0.11 
Number  of  Observations  255 255 255 255 255  255 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The average manual mD  and 
communication cD skill supply by native workers in a state-year are cleaned in a first-stage regression as described in Table 4. The explanatory variable is the foreign-
born share of less-educated labor. The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000). 
All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Specifications (1)-(2) instrument using the imputed share of 
Mexicans constructed as described in the main text. Specifications (3)-(4) instrument using the distance between the center of gravity of the state and the Mexican 
border and an indicator for states on the Mexican border, all interacted with four decade dummies.  Specifications (5) and (6) use all instrumental variables together. 
Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state.   





Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Native Supply of Tasks Controlling for Technology and Demand Factors, 2SLS Estimates with All 
Available Instruments 
 
Dependent Variable: Relative Task Supply among Domestic Workers, ln(CommunicationD / ManualD ) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Communication Definition:  Basic Basic 
Manual Definition:  Basic Extended 
Explanatory Variables: 
      















Percentage of Workers 




















Decomposition of the Effect between Communication and Manual Tasks 
Effect of Foreign-Born 













Effect of Foreign-Born 













Number of Observations  255  255  255  255  255  255 
 
Note:  The top three rows report estimates of the impact of the foreign-born share, percentage of computer users, and industry-driven change in relative task intensity on the 
relative task supply of natives. The bottom two rows report the effect of immigration on the supply of communication and manual tasks separately.  The units of observation in 
each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed 
effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 







Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on Long-Term Immigrants’ Supply of Tasks 



















Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is indicated in the first column. The average manual 
mLT and communication cLT skill supply by long-term immigrants in a state-year are calculated by averaging the basic definition of individual skill supply 
using personal weight times hours worked as weights. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born share of less-educated labor.  The units of observation in 
each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC for the period 1970-2000).  Year 1960 cannot be used as there is no 
information on the year of immigration. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.  
** indicates significance at the 1% level 






































Long-Term Immigrants’   
Ln( mLT ) 
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M















Number of Observations  204  204  204  204  
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Table 8 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Task Supply of Highly Educated Native-Born Workers, Basic Skill Definitions 



















Note: Each cell reports the coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each regression is defined in the first column.  The explanatory variable is the 
share of immigrants among workers with high school education or less. Each regression controls for the foreign-born share of workers with some college education or more 
(to avoid spurious correlations) and for state and year fixed effects. The units of observation are 50 U.S. states plus DC in each Census year, 1960-2000. The method of 
estimation is described in the column header. In each regression we weight observations by the employment in the cell and we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors.  




































        








Number of Observations  255  255  255  255  
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Table 9 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks among Different Demographic Groups of US-Born Workers 
Workers with a High School Degree or Less, Controlling for Individual Characteristics in the Construction of Aggregate Skills 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable is calculated for specific demographic groups. In each comparison, Group 
1 earns lower wages than Group 2 does. The average manual  D c and communication  D m  skill supply for each group in a state-year are calculated by averaging 
individual supply using personal weight times hours worked as weights. The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial 
panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is 
2SLS using all instruments. Regressions use employment in the cell as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust and clustered by state.  
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
  
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share among Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
Dependent Variables: Basic Definitions of Communication and Manual Skills, Less-Educated Native Workers 
Dependent Variable:   Parameter





Group 2: Men 
Group 1: Young   
(18-40)  
Group 2: Old (41-65) 
Group 1: No Degree       
Group 2: High School 
Degree 
2SLS, All Instruments 








Group 1, Ln( cD)  γ








Group 1, Ln( mD )  γ
















Group 2,  Ln( cD)  γ
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Table 10 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Total Supply of Tasks 
Workers with a High School Degree or Less, Controlling for Individual Characteristics in the Construction of Aggregate Skills 
 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The average manual and communication 
skill supply by native and immigrant workers in a state-year are cleaned in a first-stage regression that preserves the national average. They are then combined using 
hours worked by natives and immigrants as weight to produce total skill supply at the state-year level. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born share of less-
educated labor.  The units of observation in each regression are US states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000). All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects.   ** indicates significance at the 1% level * indicates significance at the 5% level 
 




































            
All Less Educated  
Ln(C/M)  



































































Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
NA 9.7 NA  10.1  NA  10.5 NA 10.2 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of Exogeneity of 
Instruments  
NA 0.29 NA 0.26  NA  0.24  NA  0.25 
Number of Observations  255  255  255  255  255  255  255  255  
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Table 11 
Estimates of the Relative Wage Elasticity of Communication versus Manual Tasks 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 










IVs  All IVs 
Communication 
Definition:  Basic Extended 
Manual 





















1.33 0.71  0.64  0.63  1.42 0.68  0.64  0.64 
F-test of Joint 
Significance of 
the Instruments 
n.a. 2.7  14.5 11.4  n.a. 2.7 14.5 11.4 
Observations 255  255  255  255 255 255  255  255 
 
 
Note: The explanatory variable is the negative of the logarithm of the relative supply of communication versus manual tasks among all workers. 
In Specifications (1) to (4) we use the basic (more strict) definition of communication and manual tasks. In Specifications (5) through (8) we 
use the extended definitions of tasks. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for 
each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state.  
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Arizona  8% 29%  3.2%  -14.2%  -1.3% -8.2%  2.5% -5.7% 
California  12% 24%  1.5%  -8.4%  0.3%  -4.5%  2.3% -2.2% 
DC  6% 10%  0.5%  -3.3%  -0.4% -2.0%  1.9% -0.1% 
Florida  14% 14%  -0.1%  -2.3%  2.8%  0.2%  1.2% 1.4% 
Hawaii  7% 8%  0.1%  -3.4%  4.9%  -0.3%  0.9% 0.6% 
Illinois  7% 12%  0.8%  -3.5%  0.7% -1.8%  1.3% -0.5% 
Nevada  16% 34%  3.5%  -12.0%  1.4%  -5.8%  2.2% -3.6% 
New Jersey  13% 10%  -0.6%  -0.4%  3.7%  1.6%  1.3% 2.9% 
New York  10% 13%  0.3%  -2.5%  1.1%  -0.7%  1.6% 0.9% 
Texas  8% 22%  2.1%  -8.8%  0.0% -4.8%  1.8% -3.0% 
United States  6% 9%  0.6%  -2.8%  1.2%  -1.2%  0.9% -0.3% 
 
 
Note: The variables and parameters used in the simulations reported above are described in the text. In particular, we assumed σ=1.75 and θL=1. The ten states chosen are 
those with highest foreign-born employment shares among less-educated workers in 2000. The parameters used to estimate the change in supply of each task among native 
workers in response to immigration are the parameters in Column (6) of Table 5, namely γ
M=0.33 and γ
C =-0.00.   
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Communication/Manual Intensity of Natives, Recent Immigrants, and Long-Term Immigrants; US 1970-2000 











1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Recent Immigrants (10 years or less in the country)




Note: The relative C/M supply for the US economy is constructed by aggregating individuals’ supply of communication and manual skills, 
weighted by their hours worked. Natives are individuals with US citizenship at birth, recent immigrants are non-citizens or naturalized 
citizens who resided in the US for ten or fewer years, long-term immigrants are non-citizens or naturalized citizens who resided in the US 


















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
All immigrants
Immigrants in the country for 10 years or less
 
Note: Workers are people who worked for at least one week in the representative week and at least one hour in the representative 
week. Source: Ruggles et al. (2005).  
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Figure 4 
Share of Immigrants and the Relative C/M Supply of Less-Educated Natives 
 
Panel A: In Differences 












































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Change in the Share of Immigrants among Less Educated




Panel B: In Levels 














































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Share of Immigrants among Less Educated
Fitted values
U.S. states plus DC, year 2000
 
Note: The fitted lines are from a weighted least square regression (weights equal to less-educated 
employment in the state). Panel A: Slope = 0.34, standard error = 0.04; Panel B: Slope = 0.67 






Less-Educated Immigrant Share and the Compensation of Communication Relative to 















































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Share of Immigrants among less educated workers




Note: The relative compensation of Communication and Manual skills is constructed by running 
a wage regression on less educated workers, controlling for individual characteristics and 
allowing the compensation of skills to vary across occupation and states (but not within a state 
across occupations). The detailed description of the procedure is in section 4.3 of the text. The 
fitted line is from a weighted least squares regression (weights equal to employment of less 
educated in the state). Slope = 0.82, standard error = 0.13.  
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Table A1 
Manual (m), Communication (c), & Relative (c/m) Skill Percentiles by Occupation 
 
Occupation M  C  C/M    Occupation M  C  C/M 
Psychologists  0.19 0.91 1.00   Purchasing  managers, agents & buyers, nec  0.40  0.82  0.90 
Management  analysts  0.19 0.93 1.00   Computer software developers  0.29  0.61  0.90 
Subject instructors (HS/college)  0.22  0.91  1.00    Metallurgical & materials engineers  0.36  0.74  0.90 
Atmospheric & space scientists  0.20  0.77 1.00   Geologists 0.34  0.69 0.90 
Lawyers  0.23 0.88 1.00   Legal  assistants/paralegals/legal support/etc  0.36  0.73  0.90 
Judges  0.23 0.88 1.00   Special  education teachers  0.39  0.78  0.90 
Financial  managers  0.23 0.83 1.00   Buyers, wholesale & retail trade  0.31  0.63  0.90 
Medical scientists  0.23  0.84  1.00    Managers & administrators, nec  0.35  0.69  0.90 
Business & promotion agents  0.24  0.86  1.00    Correspondence & order clerks  0.33  0.66  0.88 
Managers of properties & real estate  0.21  0.74 1.00   Air  traffic  controllers  0.40 0.77 0.88 
Physicists & astronomers  0.23  0.76  0.99    Transportation ticket & reservation agents  0.36  0.69  0.88 
Legislators  0.30 1.00 0.99   Physicians  0.49 0.93 0.87 
Chief executives & public administrators  0.30  1.00  0.99    Material recording/scheduling/planning… 0.34  0.65  0.87 
Dietitians & nutritionists  0.23  0.74 0.99   Payroll  &  timekeeping clerks  0.25 0.47 0.87 
Editors  &  reporters  0.27 0.87 0.99   Pharmacists  0.40 0.76 0.87 
Economists, & market/survey researchers  0.21  0.68  0.99    Administrative support jobs, nec  0.34  0.63  0.87 
Operations & systems researchers/analysts  0.20  0.64 0.99   Welfare  service  aides  0.42 0.78 0.87 
Management support occupations  0.25  0.80 0.99   Librarians  0.48 0.88 0.86 
Actuaries  0.20 0.61 0.99   Computer  &  peripheral equip operators  0.28  0.52  0.86 
Technical  writers  0.22 0.69 0.99   Office supervisors  0.54  0.98  0.86 
Managers of service organizations, nec  0.29  0.88 0.99   Physicians'  assistants  0.38 0.68 0.85 
Advertising & related sales jobs  0.29 0.89 0.99   Bookkeepers  &  accounting/auditing clerks  0.31 0.57 0.85 
Aerospace engineer  0.23 0.71 0.99   Dispatchers 0.46  0.83 0.84 
Social scientists, nec  0.27  0.82  0.99    Postmasters & mail superintendents  0.31  0.56  0.84 
Marketing/advertising mgrs & specialists  0.29 0.84 0.99   Chemists  0.37 0.66 0.84 
Insurance sales occupations  0.28  0.81  0.99    Records clerks  0.32  0.56  0.84 
Proofreaders  0.21 0.58 0.98   Bank  tellers  0.40 0.68 0.84 
Writers & authors  0.27  0.77  0.98    Computer systems analysts & scientists  0.36  0.61  0.84 
HR & labor relations managers  0.32  0.89  0.98   Statistical  clerks  0.31 0.52 0.83 
Vocational & educational counselors  0.29  0.80 0.98   Podiatrists  0.53 0.87 0.83 
Personnel/HR/training/labor specialists  0.29  0.81  0.98    Agricultural & food scientists  0.32  0.53  0.83 
Insurance adjusters/examiners/investigators  0.26  0.69 0.98   Inspectors/compliance  officers  0.48 0.78 0.83 
Mgrs of medicine & health occupations  0.32  0.86  0.97    Health record tech specialists  0.46  0.74  0.83 
Speech therapists  0.35  0.92 0.97   Occupational  therapists 0.50  0.80  0.83 
Financial services sales occupations  0.29 0.75 0.97   Announcers  0.41 0.65 0.83 
Urban & regional planners  0.34  0.88  0.97    Petroleum, mining, & geological engineers  0.38  0.61  0.83 
Interviewers,  enumerators,  &  surveyors  0.29 0.74 0.97   Drafters  0.37 0.59 0.83 
Eligibility clerks for government programs  0.28  0.71 0.97   Mechanical  engineers 0.43  0.67  0.83 
Managers in education & related fields  0.33 0.85 0.97   General  office  clerks  0.35 0.54 0.83 
HR clerks, except payroll & timekeepers  0.30  0.77  0.97    Electrical engineer  0.31  0.45  0.82 
Sales  engineers  0.32 0.82 0.97   Purchasing  agents/buyers, of farm products  0.40  0.58  0.82 
Secretaries  0.32 0.82 0.97   Non-Horticultural farm managers  0.45  0.64  0.82 
Other financial specialists  0.24  0.60  0.94    Primary school teachers  0.50  0.70  0.82 
Bill & account collectors  0.29  0.73  0.94    Billing clerks & related financial records  0.27  0.37  0.82 
Social  workers  0.31 0.76 0.94   Not-elsewhere-classified  engineers  0.47 0.65 0.81 
Customer service reps, investigators, …  0.35  0.84  0.94    Mathematicians & mathematical scientists  0.24  0.34  0.81 
Real estate sales occupations  0.32  0.76 0.93   Receptionists 0.39  0.53 0.81 
Architects  0.34 0.79 0.92   Civil  engineers  0.45 0.61 0.80 
Clergy  &  religious  workers  0.40 0.91 0.92   Registered  nurses  0.66 0.87 0.80 
Accountants & auditors  0.32  0.72  0.92   Biological  scientists  0.43  0.56  0.80 
Hotel clerks  0.35  0.78  0.92    Optical goods workers  0.41  0.52  0.80 
Insurance  underwriters  0.29 0.62 0.92   Funeral  directors  0.51 0.65 0.80 
Salespersons, nec  0.33  0.70  0.92    Inspectors of agricultural products  0.61  0.78  0.80 
Art/entertainment performers & related  0.38 0.80 0.90   Secondary school teachers  0.58  0.73  0.80 
Industrial  engineers  0.31 0.64 0.90   Optometrists  0.56 0.70 0.80 






Occupation m  c  c/m    Occupation m  c  c/m 
Licensed  practical  nurses  0.63 0.77 0.80   Broadcast equipment operators  0.63  0.41  0.61 
Food-serving & lodging managers  0.65  0.79  0.80    Surveyors/cartographers/mapping scientists 0.55 0.36 0.61 
Supervisors of motor vehicle transportation  0.52  0.63  0.79    Weighers, measurers, & checkers  0.58  0.37  0.61 
Library  assistants  0.55 0.66 0.79   Public  transportation attendants/inspectors  0.66  0.42  0.61 
Data entry keyers  0.46  0.53 0.79   Recreation  facility  attendants 0.51 0.31 0.61 
Supervisors of mechanics & repairers  0.74  0.86  0.78    Railroad conductors & yardmasters  0.81  0.49  0.60 
Kindergarten & earlier school teachers  0.48 0.54 0.78   Retail  sales clerks  0.51  0.30  0.60 
File  clerks  0.54 0.60 0.78   Dancers  0.75 0.43 0.58 
Typists  0.37  0.41  0.78    Art makers: painters, sculptors, crafts, …  0.53  0.31  0.58 
Supervisors of personal service jobs, nec  0.39  0.43  0.78    Fire fighting, prevention, & inspection  0.85  0.48  0.58 
Teachers , nec  0.33  0.36  0.78    Pest control occupations 0.83  0.47 0.58 
Baggage porters  0.54 0.58 0.77   Shipping  &  receiving clerks  0.64 0.36 0.57 
Guards, watchmen, doorkeepers  0.52  0.56  0.77    Taxi cab drivers & chauffeurs  0.74  0.41  0.57 
Production supervisors or foremen  0.60  0.65  0.76    Postal clerks, excluding mail carriers  0.66  0.36  0.56 
Power  plant  operators  0.54 0.57 0.75   Cashiers  0.73 0.38 0.56 
Therapists, nec  0.66  0.69  0.75    Elevator installers & repairers  0.84  0.42  0.53 
Foresters & conservation scientists  0.65  0.67  0.75    Cooks, variously defined  0.67  0.32  0.53 
Chemical  technicians  0.50 0.52 0.75   Hairdressers & cosmetologists  0.62  0.30  0.50 
Chemical  engineers  0.46 0.47 0.74   Motion picture projectionists  0.52  0.25  0.49 
Personal service occupations, nec  0.51  0.51  0.74    Repairers of industrial electrical equipment  0.77  0.36  0.49 
Construction  inspectors  0.66 0.66 0.74   Kitchen  workers  0.62 0.28 0.49 
Dental  assistants  0.65 0.65 0.74   Explosives  workers  0.87 0.39 0.49 
Health  aides,  except  nursing  0.51 0.51 0.74   Electricians  0.93 0.40 0.49 
Supervisors & proprietors of sales jobs  0.50 0.49 0.74   Ushers  0.50 0.22 0.48 
Veterinarians  0.74  0.73  0.71    Forge & hammer operators  0.73  0.31  0.48 
Supervisors of construction work  0.63  0.61  0.71    Bakers  0.62  0.26  0.48 
Archivists  &  curators  0.46 0.43 0.70   Bus  drivers  0.79 0.33 0.48 
Respiratory  therapists  0.74 0.69 0.70   Crossing guards & bridge tenders  0.59  0.24  0.47 
Physical therapists  0.77  0.71  0.70   Winding/twisting  textile/apparel operatives  0.82 0.34 0.47 
Supervisors of cleaning & building service  0.37 0.34 0.70   Knitters,  loopers,  &  toppers textile op  0.82  0.34  0.47 
Clinical laboratory technologies/technicians  0.67 0.62 0.70   Messengers  0.82 0.34 0.47 
Health technologists & technicians, nec  0.71 0.65 0.70   Separating/filtering/clarifying machine op  0.82  0.33  0.47 
Guides  0.53  0.47  0.70    Animal caretakers except on farms  0.72  0.29  0.47 
Police, detectives, & private investigators  0.79 0.71 0.70   Photographers  0.81 0.32 0.46 
Door-to-door/street sales & news vendors  0.35  0.31  0.69    Photographic process workers  0.63  0.25  0.46 
Designers  0.51 0.45 0.69   Athletes,  sports instructors, & officials  0.77  0.30  0.46 
Musician or composer  0.41  0.36  0.69    Stock & inventory clerks  0.54  0.21  0.46 
Child care workers  0.66  0.58  0.69    Repairers of electrical equipment, nec  0.74  0.29  0.45 
Engineering  technicians,  nec  0.55 0.47 0.68   Barbers  0.56 0.22 0.45 
Dentists  0.69  0.58  0.67    Tool & die makers & die setters  0.74  0.29  0.45 
Airplane pilots & navigators  0.74  0.59  0.67    Plumbers, pipe fitters, & steamfitters  0.86  0.32  0.45 
Recreation workers  0.66  0.52  0.67    Machine operators, nec  0.80  0.29  0.44 
Supervisors of agricultural occupations  0.75  0.59 0.67   Dental  hygienists  0.66 0.24 0.42 
Other law enforcement: sheriffs, bailiffs, …  0.69  0.53  0.67    Food roasting & baking machine operators  0.76  0.27  0.42 
Radiologic  tech  specialists  0.75 0.58 0.67   Automobile  mechanics  0.87 0.30 0.42 
Repairers of data processing equipment  0.66  0.51 0.67   Boilermakers  0.87 0.30 0.41 
Nursing aides, orderlies, & attendants  0.72  0.55  0.67    Repairers of mechanical controls & valves  0.85  0.30  0.40 
Dental laboratory & medical appliance tech  0.64  0.49  0.64    Numerically controlled machine tool op  0.80  0.28  0.40 
Biological technicians  0.55  0.42  0.64    Drilling & boring machine operators  0.80 0.27 0.40 
Other science technicians  0.61  0.46  0.64   Meter  readers  0.80 0.27 0.40 
Graders & sorters in manufacturing  0.56  0.40  0.64    Mail clerks, outside of post office  0.67  0.22  0.40 
Other health & therapy  0.67  0.48  0.63    Helpers, constructions  0.94  0.32  0.40 
Waiter/waitress  0.59  0.41  0.63    Electric power installers & repairers  0.86  0.29  0.40 
Protective services, nec  0.58  0.40  0.61    Machinery maintenance occupations  0.79  0.26  0.40 
Freight, stock, & materials handlers  0.61  0.42  0.61    Truck, delivery, & tractor drivers  0.88  0.29  0.40 






Occupation m  c  c/m    Occupation m  c  c/m 
Timber, logging, & forestry workers  0.78  0.25  0.34    Assemblers of electrical equipment  0.68  0.11  0.21 
Shoe  repairers  0.74 0.24 0.34   Plasterers  0.92 0.15 0.19 
Mail & paper handlers  0.73  0.23  0.34    Welders & metal cutters  0.75  0.12  0.19 
HVAC & refrigeration mechanics  0.85 0.27 0.34   Mixing  &  blending machine operatives 0.83  0.14 0.18 
Insulation  workers  0.70 0.22 0.34   Laundry  workers  0.66 0.10 0.18 
Locksmiths & safe repairers  0.81  0.25  0.34    Structural metal workers  0.89  0.13  0.17 
Telecom & line installers & repairers  0.79  0.24  0.34    Other woodworking machine operators  0.78  0.12  0.17 
Packers, fillers, & wrappers  0.96 0.29 0.33   Aircraft  mechanics 0.86 0.13 0.17 
Water & sewage treatment plant operators  0.79  0.24  0.33    Punching & stamping press operatives  0.83  0.12  0.17 
Bus, truck, & stationary engine mechanics  0.86  0.26  0.33    Concrete & cement workers  0.85  0.12  0.17 
Mail carriers for postal service  0.74  0.22  0.32    Mechanics & repairers, nec  0.84  0.12  0.17 
Waiter's  assistant  0.66 0.19 0.32   Upholsterers  0.70 0.10 0.16 
Drillers of oil wells  0.91  0.27 0.31   Small  engine  repairers 0.69 0.10 0.16 
Rollers, roll hands, & finishers of metal  0.91  0.26  0.31    Housekeepers, maids, butlers, stewards, …  0.55  0.08  0.16 
Glaziers  0.79  0.22  0.31    Slicing & cutting machine operators  0.78  0.10  0.14 
Printing machine operators, nec  0.83  0.23  0.31    Painting machine operators  0.81  0.11  0.14 
Carpenters  0.93 0.25 0.31   Dressmakers  &  seamstresses  0.62 0.08 0.13 
Railroad brake, coupler, & switch operators  0.86  0.23  0.29    Janitors  0.72  0.09  0.13 
Batch  food  makers  0.69 0.19 0.29   Masons,  tilers, & carpet installers  0.86  0.11  0.11 
Sales demonstrators / promoters / models  0.44 0.12 0.29   Textile sewing machine operators 0.73  0.09 0.10 
Locomotive operators (engineers/firemen)  0.73  0.19  0.29    Butchers & meat cutters  0.81  0.09  0.09 
Sheet metal duct installers  0.81  0.22  0.29    Misc material moving occupations  0.69  0.08  0.09 
Garage/service station related occupations  0.84 0.22 0.29   Grinding/abrading/buffing/polishing  workrs 0.78 0.08 0.09 
Parking lot attendants  0.84  0.22  0.29    Plant & system op, stationary engineers  0.71  0.07  0.09 
Heat treating equipment operators  0.91  0.24  0.29    Washing/cleaning/pickling machine op  0.54  0.06  0.09 
Office machine operators, nec  0.47  0.12  0.29    Industrial machinery repairers  0.95  0.09  0.09 
Auto  body  repairers  0.91 0.23 0.29   Farm  workers  0.90 0.08 0.08 
Other plant & system operators  0.63  0.16  0.28    Hand molders & shapers, except jewelers  0.83  0.07  0.07 
Crane, derrick, winch, & hoist operators  0.82  0.20 0.28   Gardeners  &  groundskeepers  0.82 0.07 0.07 
Textile cutting machine operators  0.83 0.21 0.28   Drillers  of earth  0.95 0.07 0.06 
Patternmakers & model makers  0.74  0.18  0.28    Typesetters & compositors  0.61  0.04  0.06 
Sawing machine operators & sawyers  0.81  0.20  0.28    Laborers outside construction  0.74  0.05  0.05 
Cementing & gluing machining operators  0.92  0.22  0.28    Graders & sorters of agricultural products  0.67  0.04  0.03 
Garbage & recyclable material collectors  0.86  0.21  0.28    Molders, & casting machine operators  0.85  0.05  0.03 
Paving/surfacing/tamping equipment op  0.88  0.21 0.28   Metal  platers  0.65 0.04 0.02 
Heavy equipment & farm equipment mech  0.91  0.21  0.28    Helpers, surveyors  0.79  0.05  0.02 
Nail/tacking machine operators (wood)  0.88 0.21 0.28   Machine feeders & offbearers 0.91  0.05 0.02 
Precision grinders & filers  0.83  0.19  0.27    Vehicle washers & equipment cleaners 0.72  0.04  0.02 
Cabinetmakers & bench carpenters  0.94  0.22  0.27    Home appliance & power tool operators  0.63  0.03  0.02 
Furnace, kiln, & non-food oven operators  0.84 0.19 0.27   Bookbinders 0.71  0.04  0.02 
Lathe, milling, & turning machine op 0.77  0.17  0.27   Other  mining  occupations 0.84  0.04 0.02 
Ship  crews  &  marine  engineers  0.68 0.15 0.27   Miners  0.77 0.03 0.02 
Millwrights 0.91  0.20 0.27   Shoemaking  machine  operators 0.63 0.03 0.02 
Precision makers, repairers, & smiths  0.66  0.13  0.27    Excavating & loading machine operators  0.76  0.03  0.02 
Paper  folding  machine  operators  0.74 0.15 0.27   Engravers  0.70 0.02 0.01 
Lay-out workers  0.74  0.14  0.27    Fishers, hunters, & kindred  0.89  0.02  0.01 
Wood lathe/routing/planning machine op  0.74  0.14 0.27   Paperhangers  0.71 0.01 0.01 
Misc food prep workers  0.81  0.15  0.26    Furniture & wood finishers  0.64  0.01  0.01 
Misc textile machine operators  0.66 0.12 0.25   Pressing machine operators (clothing) 0.69  0.01 0.01 
Farmers (owners & tenants)  0.77  0.15  0.25    Operating engineers of construction equip  0.71  0.01  0.01 
Extruding & forming machine operators  0.89  0.16  0.25    Roofers & slaters  0.72  0.01  0.01 
Construction trades, nec  0.79  0.14  0.24    Drywall installers  0.66  0.00  0.00 
Painters, construction & maintenance  0.83  0.15  0.24           
Elevator  operators  0.83 0.15 0.24          
Packers & packagers by hand  0.65  0.11  0.23           











Summary Statistics for the Estimated State-Specific Compensation of Manual and Communication Tasks,  
Basic Definitions of Skills 
 





2   Observations 
1960 519  566  0.41  7738 
1970 603  704  0.43  10591 
1980 664  617  0.31  15880 
1990 547  557  0.38  15607 
2000 543  576  0.32  15142 
 
Note: The compensation paid to manual and communication tasks is in 2000 US dollars and corresponds to weekly returns. R
2 comes 
from Regression (21) when estimated with a constant term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 